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Introduction 
 The Second World War was a conflict decided by the most advanced military 
technology of its time: the airplane. Conflicts throughout history reveal the trend that the 
victors of war are most often those who best use and produce the dominant weapon of 
the era. Just as artillery and the machine-gun had dominated the battlefield of the 
previous world war, or black-powder weapons of yesteryear, the airplane would forever 
change the conduct of war in the 20th century. This paper is meant to highlight the 
immense impact that the war in the skies had on every facet of the war. Bombers 
rocked the home front for many in strategic bombing raids. Transport planes delivered 
waves of airborne infantry in the liberation of Europe. Attack planes and fighters fought 
for supremacy in support of the ground forces in the East, and torpedo planes would 
sink mighty battle fleets in the Pacific. In all of these theatres of war it was the war in the 
air that determined the outcome.  
This paper, and by extension the war in the air, cannot be properly understood 
without establishing an understanding of associated terminology, as well as the history 
of airpower in the military leading up to the onset of war in 1939. Aerial superiority itself 
is a twofold entity, and is divided between tactical and strategic levels. Tactical 
superiority exists within a battle which allows for unhindered or lightly opposed 
operation of air-forces within a battlespace. Strategic superiority allows for large-scale 
operations with a high chance for success and without a realistic threat of unacceptable 
casualties or similar retaliation. Strategic bombing is an extension of strategic 
superiority, but is not the same. Rather, it is the use of aircraft to deliver targeted attacks 
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behind the front lines to deal damage to enemy morale and production, communication, 
transportation, or storage centers.  
A differentiation between types of aircraft, which will be referred to in shorthand 
throughout this paper, should also be understood. ‘Fighter’ aircraft are categorized as 
those which are designed and used specifically to engage other aircraft. ‘Bomber’ 
aircraft are designed and deployed specifically for delivering payloads against ground or 
naval targets. ‘Fighter-bomber’ hybrid aircraft were also deployed, and several sub-
categories of these broad categories such as dive bombers and torpedo bombers were 
used. Within the discussion of relative strength of air forces the term ‘serviceable’ 
aircraft will be used. This refers to aircraft that are in sufficient condition for combat 
operation. By extension, non-serviceable aircraft are those which although not 
destroyed require repair before they are able to be deployed.  
Aerial combat was an evolving sphere of military application ever since the 
French first used hot air balloons to direct artillery fire in 1794. An advance in military 
aviation brought huge leaps in technology, manufacturing, piloting ability, and human 
ingenuity. The Second World War was a period of tremendous advancement in all of 
these areas. At the onset of The Second World War all of the potential applications of 
military aircraft had not yet been fully realized despite the widespread use of aircraft in 
the First World War. The airplane was still a relatively new technology when the war 
began in 1939; as the famous Wright brothers’ flight had occurred only three decades 
before in 1903. The first ever recorded use of airplanes as military aircraft was by the 
Italian military to spot Turkish forces during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. 
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During the First World War biplanes and triplanes battled in the first ever aerial 
dogfights in history. This was enabled primarily by technological advancement. The 
Dutch aircraft engineer Anthony Fokker developed an “interrupter gear” which allowed 
machine guns mounted on a plane to fire through the propeller without damaging the 
blades. With this advancement the first true fighter aircraft first took to the skies. Soon 
pilots gained international acclaim for their combat prowess. So called Aces such as the 
German “Red” Baron Manfred von Richthofen, became celebrities in their own right.  
The Fokker triplane fighters of the Germans proved to be the largest killer of Allied 
bomber aircraft during the First World War.1 These engagements led both sides to 
begin to outfit bomber aircraft with defensive gunners to stave off enemy fighters. This 
concept would become a staple of interwar bomber design and particularly resonated 
with American aircraft designers. 
Early bombers were no more than pilots dropping explosives out of their aircraft, 
but by the end of the war fixed wing aircraft releasing bombs became commonplace. 
Unlike the larger faster bombers of the Second World War that held their payload within 
the fuselage and dropped them out of bomb bay doors, First World War bombers 
carried their payloads on their aircraft’s wings or attached to the underside of the 
fuselage. The main bomber used by French and American forces was the French 
designed twelve cylinder engine Bregut Type XIV, which entered service in 1916.2 The 
aircraft could reach speeds of 110 miles per hour, had a maximum flight time of three 
hours, and could reach altitudes of 19,000 feet. Although reaching these milestones 
                                               
1 "Letters From a WWI Fighter Pilot." Wings Of Gold 36, no. 4 (2011) 78. 
2 "Letters From a WWI Fighter Pilot.", 80. 
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were impressive for First World War era technology, the bomber aircraft of the coming 
war were vastly superior in every measure. 
The first ever ‘strategic’ bombing raids were attempted by the Germans as large 
zeppelins attacked Paris and London during the First World War. Although miniscule 
when compared to the numbers resulting from the Battle of Britain, 254 metric tons of 
bombs were dropped over England, (which was far removed from the frontlines of 
France) by German aircraft. These attacks proved both the viability of using aircraft to 
strike at valuable economic and production centers, as well as the superiority of the 
airplane over the vulnerable zeppelin airships which were too slow and easy to target by 
defending aircraft. German air marshals also made early attempts at nighttime bombing, 
although limited accuracy and visibility proved these attacks to be ineffective. 
Airborne infantry did not garner widespread use until the German 
Fallschirmjagers proved their tactical effectiveness at the beginning of the Second 
World War, but they were not the first ever parachute infantry. In 1918 the first recorded 
airborne infantry jump occurred when Italian saboteurs parachuted behind enemy lines. 
By the end of the First World War both sides had begun to produce aircraft in much 
greater numbers and deploy them in massed formations over the battlefield. 
The interwar period saw vast advances in aircraft design and technologies as 
world powers began to develop the next generation of airplanes for military and civilian 
usage. Efficient and streamlined metal fighters soon replaced their wooden and canvas 
precursors reaching higher speeds and maneuverability than ever before. In the 1930’s 
iconic aircraft such as the American B-17 bomber, British Supermarine Spitfire, and 
German Ju-88 Stuka dive bomber were all in prototype stages of development and 
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would be ready for service when the war began. These warbirds would see heavy 
action throughout the Second World War even as newer aircraft and technologies were 
developed during the conflict.  
The Spanish Civil War of the late 1930’s would serve as a proving ground for 
new Luftwaffe aircraft and mold German strategic thinking moving forward. Newly 
developed fast attack bombers and fighter/bomber hybrids such as the Stuka showed 
the extreme effectiveness of combined air and ground forces. German commanders 
would use lessons learned fighting in Spain to overwhelm much of Europe in the early 
stages of the Second World War, with a great deal of their successes being attributed to 
overwhelming aerial dominance over the nations they conquered. 
Air-centric operations theory was first developed during the interwar period. This 
new paradigm of strategic thinking saw future conflicts as being determined by whoever 
held the skies over the battlefield. The rapid advances in aircraft design and technology 
only served to fuel the arguments for increased focus on expansion of air power by 
military leaders such as American Billy Mitchell. Mitchell was an outspoken advocate for 
the development of American airpower after he experienced firsthand its first real 
combat applications in France during World War I.3 Mitchell was also a large proponent 
for the US bomber program and strategic bombing applications, and did have some 
success in securing funding that would lead to development of bomber aircraft such as 
the B-17 Flying Fortress.4 
 
                                               
3 Alfred F Hurley, Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power, (Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1975) 3. 
4 Hurley, 87. 
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Chapter I: The War in Europe and Strategic Bombing 
The skies burned over Europe as the gleaming wings of thousands of metal 
warplanes took to the air to do battle; the fate of the world hung in the balance. From 
1939 to 1945 the Allied and Axis powers waged a constant struggle to stake their claim 
as masters of the land, sea, and air. Early combat clearly showed that Hitler’s Luftwaffe 
was the superior air power in Europe. The Allied high-command had to catch up. Both 
sides expended immense resources on the development and production of new 
warbirds dedicated to serving that end. Unlocking the secrets to technologies such as 
jet engines and radar would become the focus of scientists around the globe, and young 
men seeking adventure and wanting to serve their countries would be sent into the sky 
to fight and die for their homelands.5 
 Allied victory in Europe was a product of aerial superiority. Although it can be 
argued that other factors pointed to a near certain Allied victory once America entered 
the war, at the very least the rapidity of the Allied victory can be attributed to achieving 
                                               
5 For information regarding the Luftwaffe and its impact on early Nazi success in the war 
seek the following sources: R.J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945, (New York: Stein & 
Day, 1980); Douglas C. Dildy, “The Air Battle for England: The Truth Behind the Failure 
of the Luftwaffe's Counter-Air Campaign in 1940”. Air Power History 63, no. 2 (2016): 
27-40.; Williamson Murray. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (New York: 
Chartwell Books, 1986). The sources listed here provide great insight into Allied air 
power during all phases of the war: Marshall L. Michel  “The P-51 Mustang: The Most 
Important Aircraft In History.” Air  Power History 55, no. 4 (2008): 46-57.; Kenneth P. 
Werrell “Flying Training: The American Advantage in the Battle for Air Superiority 
against the Luftwaffe.” Air Power History 61, no. 1 (2014): 34-47. The following sources 
provide a great deal of information on both Allied and Axis technological development 
during the war: Hermione Giffard “Engines of Desperation: Jet Engines, Production and 
New Weapons in the Third Reich.” Journal Of Contemporary History no. 4 (2013) 821-
844.; A. D. Harvey, “German Aircraft Design during the Third Reich.” Air Power History 
61, no. 2 (2014): 28-35.; Fred Strebeigh “How England hung the `curtain' that held Hitler 
at bay.” Smithsonian 21, no. 4, (1990): 120-129. 
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unquestioned aerial superiority by 1944. This superiority resulted as a combination of 
several key factors: technological superiority, greater production capabilities and access 
to more natural resources, superior training, and more effective understanding and 
deployment of aerial resources at the strategic and tactical levels.6 The relatively new 
concept of air warfare was made paramount by the Allies which turned the tide of the 
war. Meanwhile, in both the pre-war buildup and during the war itself the German high-
command undervalued the battle in the skies.7 Failures in foresight and operation of the 
Luftwaffe ultimately led to German defeat in Europe. 
In the buildup to the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939 the German war 
machine was producing more aircraft than any other nation in the world. This initial 
buildup would lead to great success for the German military, allowing it to easily take 
Poland and the Low Countries, as well as inflict heavy losses on the British RAF during 
its failed defense of France.8 The Luftwaffe both failed to eliminate the retreating British 
forces at Dunkirk and successfully clear the path for a German invasion of the British 
Isles. It is important to note that this failure was not a strategic bombing effort meant to 
wholly destroy enemy production capacity, but rather an application of airpower for 
future tactical purposes in order to clear the way for invasion. Ultimately, although the 
Germans took the initiative in aircraft development and production they could not fully 
predict and prepare themselves for the demands of the air war. Had the Nazis fully 
dedicated pre-war resources to gaining air superiority over their future foes the shifted 
                                               
6 R.J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945, (New York: Stein & Day, 1980) 164.  
7 Douglas C. Dildy, “The Air Battle for England: The Truth Behind the Failure of the  
Luftwaffe's Counter-Air Campaign in 1940”. Air Power History 63, no. 2 (2016) 27. 
8 Dildy, 32. 
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balance of power in the skies a swift German victory over the RAF likely would have 
ensued. 
 The defeat of the British Expeditionary Force sent to mainland Europe in 1940 
led to the first major engagement between the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe during 
the retreat at Dunkirk (May 26 – June 4, 1940). In the eight days of the Dunkirk retreat 
the British lost thirty-six Spitfires, eight Defiants, and forty-five Hurricane aircraft, which 
when combined with the 386 aircraft lost during the defense of France took a massive 
bite out of British air power in the early stages of the war.9 In comparison, the German 
Luftwaffe lost thirty-six fighters and forty-two bombers during the siege at Dunkirk. 
Despite this loss of aircraft, British aircraft production would soon overtake that of the 
Germans. The German average of 140 Bf109s per month would soon be greatly 
outpaced Hurricane and Spitfire production which would reach 500 aircraft per month by 
July.10 Lost aircraft could be replaced, but the 186 RAF pilots lost over the European 
mainland could not. This loss of skilled combat pilots would prove to be a far greater 
blow to the RAF than the loss of airplanes.11 
 After British forces retreated back to England, the German bombing campaign 
over the island began. The Luftwaffe’s primary bomber was the Heinkel He111 twin-
engine medium bomber. Because of its inadequate defensive armament, it required 
fighter escort for all daylight missions, which in turn limited its radius of action to the 
operating range of the Bf 109E, the only truly effective fighter the Germans could field in 
                                               
9 Dildy, 32. 
10 Dildy, 32. 
11 Dildy, 35. 
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the early stages of the war.12 German intelligence also vastly overestimated the 
effectiveness of their attacks and thus continued tactics that gave only marginal 
successes at high cost.13 Much like over the skies of Dunkirk, the largest blows being 
struck by the Germans was in killing Allied pilots whose numbers were depleting at an 
increasingly alarming rate.  
The failure of the German military to outfit the Luftwaffe with the tools necessary 
to conduct a prolonged air offensive against a large nation is illustrated through the 
wide-scale production of a fighter-bomber hybrid based upon an outdated design. 
Although effective in attacking British ground forces left vulnerable on the beaches of 
Dunkirk, the Junkers Ju 87B “Stuka” dive bomber was highly vulnerable to the faster 
and more agile fighters defending the British Isles. This was in large part due to its 
outdated design. Instead of having retractable landing gears, the aircraft had fixed 
wheels below the aircraft. These would not only slow the aircraft down by providing 
increased drag, but also severely hamper its turning ability and climb rate.14 The high 
rate of attrition suffered by German dive-bombers lead to a cessation of their use to 
attack strategic targets in England. Remaining Stukas were held in reserve to be used 
during the German invasion of the United Kingdom, but such operation never took 
place.15 By the time they could be used to target enemy troops in action again during 
the Allied push into France in 1944, Allied air superiority had been achieved and the 
Stukas were once again left vulnerable to superior fighter aircraft. By providing fighter 
                                               
12 A. D. Harvey, “German Aircraft Design during the Third Reich.” Air Power History 61, 
no. 2 (2014) 30. 
13 Fred Strebeigh “How England hung the `curtain' that held Hitler at bay.” Smithsonian 
21, no. 4, (1990) 120. 
14 Harvey, 32. 
15 Dildy, 34. 
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support over their ground units, the Allies were able to in large part neutralize this arm 
of the German Luftwaffe. This in turn forced the Germans to continue to conduct attacks 
with true bomber aircraft that were vulnerable to RAF fighters and not given effective 
escorts. 
The efforts of the Reich to clear the path for a full-scale invasion of England 
became known as The Battle of Britain. It is important to note that unlike the later Allied 
bombing campaign of mainland Europe, The Battle of Britain was not a strategic 
bombing campaign effort on the part of the Luftwaffe.16 Rather, it was meant to destroy 
the ability of England to properly defend itself against a cross-channel invasion by 
targeting defensive positions. In a directive sent to high ranking members of the 
German military, Hitler outlined this as the purpose of the Luftwaffe: “The task of the Air 
Force will be: To prevent interference by the enemy Air Force. To destroy coastal 
fortresses which might operate against our disembarkation points, to break the first 
resistance of enemy land forces, and to disperse reserves on their way to the front. In 
carrying out this task the closest liaison is necessary between individual Air Force units 
and the Army invasion forces. Also, to destroy important transport highways by which 
enemy reserves might be brought up, and to attack approaching enemy naval forces as 
far as possible from our disembarkation points. I request that suggestions be made to 
me regarding the employment of parachute and airborne troops. In this connection it 
should be considered, in conjunction with the Army, whether it would be useful at the 
                                               
16 Dildy, 33. 
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beginning to hold parachute and airborne troops in readiness as a reserve, to be thrown 
in quickly in case of need.”17  
Hitler’s invasion plan followed that of the successes seen in taking France and 
the Low Countries. First the enemy air force would be destroyed by the Luftwaffe, which 
would in turn allow German mechanized infantry and tank units to push through enemy 
lines without threat of aerial attack. The rapid advance of these units was made possible 
only by the lack of hostile aircraft to impede their movement, or stop Luftwaffe attacks 
from softening defensive positions ahead of ground advances. The Luftwaffe was 
unable to achieve this goal and destroy the fighting capability of the RAF, and so an 
invasion of England was rendered impossible. In contrast, the Allies achieved this air 
superiority before their counterattack into Europe in June 1944, and this allowed for an 
advance into German territory in much the same manner as the Germans took the land 
earlier in the war. At no point in the war did either the Axis or Allies capture large areas 
of land without aerial superiority over their foes, which suggests air superiority as being 
the driving force behind the ultimate Allied victory. 
The German airforce was at a severe disadvantage against their RAF 
counterparts during the air campaign due to several critical errors in aircraft design. 
First, the Luftwaffe was not in possession of a heavy bomber. Pre-war efforts to design 
a large four-engine bomber, known as the Dornier D-17 Ural, ended in failure.18 
Although possession of such a bomber would not have had any impact on the Battle of 
Britain, as medium and light bombers stationed in France could reach targets in 
                                               
17 Adolf Hitler, “Führer Directive 16: On preparations for a landing operation against 
England” (July 16, 1940) World War II Database. <https://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=316> 
18 Dildy, 28. 
 12 
 
England without needing the operating range of heavy bombers, it would have proved 
valuable in attacking targets on the Eastern Front.19 The failure of the program in the 
mid 1930s also left German aircraft designers reluctant to pursue new bomber designs, 
and left the Luftwaffe with outdated bombers with which to attack England. Head of the 
Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, is quoted as having said regarding the failed D-17 program 
“Der Fuhrer will never ask me how big our bombers are, but how many we have.”20This 
serves to illustrate a critical flaw in thinking: being more concerned with producing large 
amounts of sub-par aircraft rather than producing those which would provide the best 
tactical and strategic advantage. 
Not only were German bombers inadequate, but their fighter aircraft were as 
well. The Bf-190 was initially superior to British fighters, but as the RAF produced faster 
aircraft the Germans had to continually modify the 109, and sacrifice key attributes such 
as turning ability for raw speed.21 Severely hampering German offensive operations was 
their production of the Bf110. Designed as a heavy fighter for bomber escort, it did 
boast exceptional range but was far outclassed by some early war RAF fighters in 
maneuverability.22 This rendered a large number of Luftwaffe fighters virtually unusable 
in the Battle of Britain, and ultimately were a massive waste of pre-war resources that 
proved costly to German prospects for victory. Although the Germans held a temporary 
advantage when the Focke-Wulf FW 190A was introduced in 1941, once the British 
outfitted the Spitfire with the new Rolls Royce Merlin engine they once again had the 
                                               
19 Dildy, 28. 
20 Dildy, 28. 
21 Harvey, 30. 
22 Dildy, 31. 
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superior fighter.23 The FW190-A also came too late to make a difference in the Battle of 
Britain, which ended with the cessation of large-scale Luftwaffe bombing in late October 
1940. When the Germans countered by producing the FW-190D later in the war, they 
were again outdone by the American P51D Mustang.24 
Another major failure of the Luftwaffe was its inability to successfully hamper 
Britain’s ability to manufacture aircraft during the conflict.25 This was in part due not just 
to the ability of Britain to successfully defend herself, but also innovation in the aircraft 
production industry. Government programs such as the Shadow Factory Program 
sought to increase aircraft production without necessitating the construction of new 
factories. One aspect of the shadow program was its use of converted management 
from the automobile industry in order to increase productivity by modeling the rapid 
production of automobile plants.26 The program also oversaw conversion of many non-
aircraft production factories into aircraft production sites. This program accounted for 
45% of British bomber production during the war. And also served to confuse the 
planning of Luftwaffe attacks, as German bombers targeted known aircraft production 
facilities much more commonly than converted plants whose new purposes were kept 
secret. 
A veritable miracle technology that perhaps was the single greatest contribution 
to British defense was radar.27 Although the Germans did pursue radar for military 
                                               
23 Harvey, 31. 
24 Harvey, 31 
25 Stephen Little, and Margaret Grieco. “Shadow factories, shallow skills? An analysis of  
work organization in the aircraft industry in the Second World War.” Labor History 52, 
no. 2, (2011) 194. 
26 Little and Grieco, 195. 
27 Strebeigh, 122. 
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application before the British began to in the late 1930s, pursuit of a flawed design 
created inconsequential results, and also lead Göring to severely underestimate, and 
virtually ignore, the importance of radar in British defensive plans.28 A radar system 
functions by sending out radio waves in a broad pattern around the station. When these 
waves strike something, such as an enemy aircraft, they reverberate back to the station 
which in turn reveals the position of the aircraft on the corresponding display driven by a 
cathode-ray tube.29 British military officials set up an intricate web of these stations all 
connected to a hidden central planning office. From here, air wings could be dispatched 
to intercept German attacks before they reached their targets, and also eliminated the 
need for general air patrols, which not only saved fuel but also maximized the use of 
valuable planes and pilots in pointed interception efforts.30 
In 1938 German strategist Helmuth Felmy stated “A war of annihilation against 
England appears to be out of the question with the resources thus far available,”31 
showing the innate flaw of German strategy to conduct a massive air campaign against 
Britain: a lack of the necessary sources of oil and aluminum for producing and operating 
massive amounts of aircraft. However, early war fuel shortages were only a prelude to 
those that were to come.32 In late 1943 and early 1944 the Germans captured a large 
amount of fuel in Italy, and had a large special reserve that was not depleted until 
                                               
28 Strebeigh, 123. 
29 Strebeigh, 123. 
30 Strebeigh, 126. 
31 Dildy, 30. 
32 Williamson Murray Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (New York: 
Chartwell Books, 1986) 228. 
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1945.33 Therefore the failure of the Luftwaffe in deploying effectively was not due to lack 
of fuel, but lack of aircraft production capability. 
Once the Battle of Britain had been won, and the offensive capability of the 
Luftwaffe neutralized, the skies over England were safe. The Allies then sought to 
eliminate German air defense capabilities over the mainland. Once Allied air forces had 
achieved strategic dominance over Europe, more tactical applications of airpower could 
ensue. Close-air-support for troop could be conducted at will, airborne forces could be 
deployed, and the liberation of Europe could begin. An effort which ultimately took the 
form of the D-Day landings and subsequent Normandy breakout. In order to achieve 
this goal, Allied bombers would target aircraft production facilities and Axis airfields. By 
targeting German aircraft on the ground and the facilities necessary to replace them the 
Allies eliminated the Luftwaffe’s ability to stop the Allied bombing campaign and reverse 
the increasingly likely outcome of the war. The ground advances in Italy and France 
would have met much greater difficulty without the bombings that preceded them.  
The strategic bombing campaign wrought previously unimaginable destruction 
upon the Axis powers. The damage to German manufacturing, infrastructure, and 
military impacted every facet of the German war effort and secured Allied aerial 
superiority. In this regard, the bombing campaign was a self-sustaining measure. With 
each airfield and factory bombed, future bombing runs would see less resistance. With 
the Luftwaffe weakened after the Battle of Britain, the British began aerial bombing of 
German industrial centers. Upon America’s entry into the war, they too would begin 
bombing of Germany and Italy from airbases in England. Although heavy casualties 
                                               
33 Murray, 228. 
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were sustained on the part of the Allies, every plane lost could be replaced by the 
increasingly powerful multinational war economy. However, every fighter lost and 
factory destroyed weakened the Luftwaffe. Because of this, the strategic bombing 
campaign was a war of attrition, wherein one side found itself increasingly at the mercy 
of the other’s bomber fleet. 
Due to heavy losses early in their earlier daytime bombing effort against 
Germany, RAF bombing strategy underwent a major shift. British bombers flew 
nighttime missions with the goal of saturation bombing as a result of their imprecise 
targeting in the early war, as well as the reduced threat of interception under the cover 
of darkness.34 This latter form of bombing was an effort to designate and attack large 
areas of German industrial cities. Everything from the factories themselves to the 
homes of workers was deemed a legitimate target. This decision was also a product of 
the relative ineffectiveness of previous raids regardless of casualty figures. The British 
Butt Report of summer 1941 found that only 20 percent of RAF bombers were able to 
make an attack within 75 miles of their intended targets, with only one plane in three 
able to come within five miles of their target, let alone release their bombload.35 
Because German industry was often located on the periphery of a city area 
bombing which targeted the city center did far less damage to industrial zones than the 
‘precision bombing’ which targeted them directly in the daytime.36 However, the relative 
risk to Allied bombers was far greater, and damage to workers’ homes within the city 
                                               
34 Michael Bess. Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II. (New York: 
Random House Inc, 2006) 92. 
35 John Plowright. The Causes, Course and Outcomes of World War Two. (London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007) 87. 
36 Gian P. Gentile. “How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?: Lessons Learned from World 
War II and Kosovo.” World of War. (New York: New York University Press, 2001) 80. 
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could hamper production even if a factory remained unscathed. In addition, it is 
important to note the relative misnomer of precision bombing in the 1940’s, as even 
advances such as the Norden bombsight could guarantee only a small fraction of what 
could be considered truly precise targeting. In this case, precision bombing was more 
theoretical than actual. Despite this American aircrews continued bombing during 
daylight hours while the British ‘de-housing campaign’ continued at nighttime.  
The adherence of American leadership to this impractical doctrine could be 
explained by political motive rather than strategic thinking. The United States was never 
attacked by German aircraft as Great Britain was. Therefore, garnering public support 
for targeting of civilian homes would be difficult at best. However, the British public 
undoubtedly sought vengeance for the Blitz and so justification of wide-area targeting 
was more palatable in Britain. Such thinking is further supported by the late war 
bombing of Japan by the United States, as daytime raids on population centers was 
common in late 1944 to 1945. However, Japan had first struck the United States at 
Pearl Harbor through air attack, and so perhaps a similar sentiment to that of the British 
existed amongst the American Public. 
The strategic bombing campaign truly began to increase in scope in 1943. By 
this time the United Sates was fully mobilizing for war, and the North Africa campaign 
had proved a disaster for Germany. During this time 5,092 tons of munitions was 
dropped on fourteen aircraft production plants. This resulted in noticeable drops in 
monthly production of German aircraft. 725 BF-109s were produced in July of 1943, but 
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only 536 in September, with a low of 357 in December. In addition production of the Fw-
190 fell from 325 in July to only 203 in December.37 
Full mobilization of the German economy for war did not occur until 1944, at a 
point by which the Allies had already firmly established control over the skies. This 
mobilization occurred at the direction of newly appointed Reich Arms Minister Albert 
Speer. Despite earlier bombing successes, aircraft production peaked at 3,375 aircraft 
per month in September 1944.38 This figure suggests that German wartime production 
recovered from early successes by the bombing offensive, but to view this figure alone 
is to see only a part of the picture. Rather, monthly production would have been far 
higher had the bombing campaign not occurred.  
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was published two years after the 
war concluded. Within this report is a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the 
bombing campaign on the German economy. It is in this research conducted after the 
war that the full impact of the campaign can be made clear. Bombing of German 
synthetic oil production, which began in earnest in July 1944 provides the best example 
of this. German refineries were producing an average of 316,000 tons of oil in July. That 
output fell to 107,000 tons in June and later 17,000 tons in September. Monthly aviation 
fuel production was reduced from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 in July and later a 
mere 5,000 in September.39 As a result monthly aviation fuel losses (fuel which was not 
replaced in production) increased upwards of 90% during this period according to 
                                               
37 The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys: European War, Pacific War. (Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Ala: Air University Press. [1987] (1947)) 17. 
38 USSBS, 19. 
39 USSBS, 21. 
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Speer.40 This eventually resulted in the cessation of all non-jet aircraft in January 1945, 
as the new jet engines were more fuel efficient. As further example to the effectiveness 
of the bomber offensive, Speer remarked after the war that the destruction of Hamburg 
by the Allies dealt a serious blow to both morale and manufacturing.41 This provides 
anecdotal evidence in support of the raw data gathered regarding the impact of the 
bombing campaign.  
 The tremendous damage done to Germany was not achieved without 
great cost. For example, bombing efforts by the 300 plane strong American Eighth 
Airforce succeeded in reducing German ball-bearing production by sixty-seven percent 
by early 1943, but it did so at the cost of sixty aircraft with damage suffered to by 
additional 138.42 This resulted in a temporary suspension of operations by the 
detachment that would not resume until March 1944 when long-range P-51 Mustang 
fighters were available for escort in large numbers.43 Such high losses were typical of 
the early bombing offensive from 1942 to 1943. In total, approximately 140,000 Allied 
airmen (85,000 American and 40,000 British, 10,000 Canadian and over 5,500 
Australians and New Zealanders) were killed during the strategic bombing offensive in 
Europe.44 
 Mirrored in these losses of Allied servicemen was those of the German 
populace. Approximately 305,000 German civilians were killed with an additional 
780,000 wounded in Allied bombing raids.45 Property damage was also tremendous, as 
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415,000 homes were destroyed and an additional 485,000 damaged, rendering 
approximately 7.5 million homeless.46 The moral and ethical implications of such 
staggering figures are apparent. Categorization of the bombing campaign as a war-
crime seems empirically provable given these figures. However, the damage to the Nazi 
war economy as a result of these raids is irrefutable. Because of this, whether morally 
justifiable or not, the Allied strategic bombing campaign was undoubtedly integral to the 
end of the Third Reich. 
The success of the Allied bombing campaign was not only a product of 
overwhelming industrial capacity. The offensive owed its success to a multitude of 
factors, from superior aircraft design and technology to superior pilot training techniques 
and conditions. Technology and aircraft design would make much more immediate and 
recognizable impacts on the conduct of the war, with the effects of improved training 
programs coming to form later in the war. The technological advancement of the radio 
proximity fuse was just one of many key technological developments achieved by the 
Allies, but its design and implementation is emblematic of the many other breakthroughs 
of the war. 
 The radio proximity fuse was the first true “smart weapon” in history. Modern 
missiles and bombs are improved variations on the original concept manufactured 
during the Second World War. This new fuse allowed for bombs, rockets, and anti-
aircraft shells to detonate at the ideal distance from their targets to maximize 
fragmentation and explosive power.47 The fuse consisted of a small radio tube smaller 
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than the average thumb fitted within a slightly larger casing that housed the remaining 
equipment needed for a miniature two-way radio at the tip of the explosive. When the 
explosive was deployed the radio would switch on and begin sending out radio waves to 
detect a target. The waves would strike their targets and then bounce back to the tube 
in the fuse, thus giving information to the device about its proximity to said target. Once 
it reached a predetermined distance the fuse would detonate the explosive it was 
attached to.48 Production of these fuses began in 1942 and would see increased 
efficiency and design improvements throughout the war. 
 The effectiveness of Allied bombing was greatly enhanced by this new fuse, 
creating vastly more efficient munitions to be used over Europe and the Pacific. 
Previously, bombs dropped from aircraft had three primary means of detonation. Early 
war bombs would drop on a timed fuse that was predetermined before takeoff. To be 
effective this required a bombardier to drop their payload at an exact height used in 
previous calculations, and could not account for variable weather or changing mission 
parameters. Due to this lack of precision or adaptability many bombs dropped would 
either detonate too early or too late, causing little damage to intended targets.49 The 
predetermined height required by these munitions also forced pilots to fly their aircraft at 
a certain altitude over the target, even if anti-aircraft fire was heavy in the area or it took 
them into the thick of an enemy fighter formation. 
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 The flawed design of timed payloads was followed by a traditional contact fuse. 
These explosives would detonate immediately on contact with the target or ground. This 
provided adequate damage against unarmored 
targets such as infantry or factory buildings, but thick 
armor plating or proper cover would shield intended 
targets.50 Other timed explosives called delayed 
fuse bombs had timers that would not start until after 
the bomb had struck its target, allowing for the 
munition to penetrate armor before detonation. Although this was effective against 
armored targets such as tanks and warships, these required direct hits on target to be 
effective and had a much smaller area of effect on 
detonation.51 Delayed fuse bombs that missed ground 
targets would often bury themselves underground 
before detonation and lose nearly all of their 
effectiveness and provide little to no fragmentation. 
With the advent of proximity, also known as variable 
timed fuses (from now on referred to as VT fuse 
bombs), the explosives would always detonate at the 
optimum height from their targets.52 For most attacks 
on enemy ground forces this was about seventy feet 
above. 53 This air-burst detonation pattern would not 
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only provide the widest spread of fragmentation and explosive force, but also negate 
most forms of traditional ground cover for infantry such as sandbags and foxholes.54 
Vehicles such as tanks were not designed with extra overhead armored plating and thus 
were also left vulnerable to this new design. Reinforced targets such as concrete 
bunkers were resistant to VT fuse equipped bombs, but when sorties sought to destroy 
these targets they would instead be equipped with delayed fuse bombs that could 
penetrate thick armor. Therefore, Allied bombers could counter any Axis attempts to 
protect resources from aerial ordinance. 
The VT fuse was applied not only with air-to-ground weapons, but also had great 
success in being applied to air-to-air and ground-to-air platforms. Unguided rockets fired 
from aircraft had moderate success being used against stationary ground targets but 
until they were outfitted with the proximity fuse were impractical to use against fast 
moving aerial targets.55 Proximity fuses on rockets had a forward cone of sensitivity of 
3,800 square feet projected by the proximity fuse. Much in the same way that the fuse 
installed on bombs detected distance to the ground, this cone of radio waves detected 
any objects that entered into it.56 When a plane entered that cone the rocket would 
detonate and spray shrapnel in the area damaging enemy aircraft. Because aircraft 
were made of weaker and lighter metals than ground targets they were much more 
vulnerable to damage. Scoring any hit on the target was crucial and could take the 
enemy out of the sky with only one or two well placed shots. This same principle applied 
to anti-aircraft shells fired from ground positions. Innovations such as this fuse provided 
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a massive advantage in aerial defense for the Allies and rendered German bombing 
raids over positions defended with the new weapon design costly and ineffective.57 For 
example, in one week in 1945, 79% of German V-1 and V-2 rockets fired at London 
were shot down by anti-aircraft guns making use of the VT fuse.58  
Perhaps the greatest success of the proximity fuse was not its effectiveness, but 
the ability of the Allies to keep its design secret throughout the entire war.59 Had Axis 
forces been armed with this weapon the massive strategic bombing campaign 
undertaken by the Allies would have suffered greater casualties and caused far less 
damage to German and Italian positions. Interestingly, German scientists began 
working on a similar design in the 1930’s that made use of capacitive radio sensors 
rather than the Doppler radar format of the Allied VT fuse. However, their work was 
halted in 1940 as they were directed to other projects deemed more important to 
German victory.60 Had they been successful in developing a working proximity fuse the 
air war over Europe likely would have been much more difficult for the Allies to win as 
German bombing would have been vastly more effective and ground targets much more 
heavily defended. 
At the onset of strategic bombing campaign, the US assumed the heavy 
armament of its bombers would negate a need for fighter escort, ignoring the lessons 
learned by the Germans in their losses over Britain. However, unlike the Germans they 
produced a long-ranged fighter; the P-51 Mustang. An aircraft that could not only share 
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the operational range of America’s bombers but also out-duel the German 
interceptors.61 The P-51D was outfitted with a Rolls Royce Merlin engine much like the 
later war British Spitfires. This made the P-51 faster than any non-jet driven German 
fighter and with much better acceleration. It also matched or exceeded German fighters 
in every measure of maneuverability.62 Allied Bombers flew in tight formations to create 
overlapping fields of .50 caliber machinegun fire and create a protective bubble in and 
around themselves. This tight grouping also created a more devastating effect on target 
as it tightly grouped the bombs dropped by the formation collectively. This did however 
increase the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire.63 Escort fighters such as the P-51 would 
fly in advance of these formations in attempt to cut off intercepting aircraft before they 
reached the bombers. 
German strategies to take out tight bomber formations were to either isolate and 
split off bombers from the group, or attack in massive formations and strafe the 
formation, aiming for the center of the bombers with the goal of detonating their payload 
or fuel tanks.64 These large formations were effective as it prevented gunners onboard 
the bombers from targeting single aircraft. However, the attrition suffered by the 
Luftwaffe during these attacks soon began to outpace their production capabilities and 
proved costly.65 Much as the British struggled to replace pilots during the Battle of 
Britain, losses of skilled Luftwaffe pilots during the Allied air campaign proved more 
disastrous than the loss of their aircraft. 
                                               
61 Marshall L. Michel  “The P-51 Mustang: The Most Important Aircraft In History.” Air  
Power History 55, no. 4 (2008) 55. 
62 Michel, 55. 
63 Michel, 49.  
64 Michel, 49. 
65 Michel, 50. 
 26 
 
In attempt to counter the superior P51D, in June 1944 the Germans put into 
action the first jet fighter in history: the Messerschmitt Me262.66 However, this proved to 
be a last gasp of the German war machine, borne as much out of production necessity 
as it was an attempt to gain tactical advantage.67 The twin jets of the Me262 was more 
efficient in terms of both manpower and material resources to produce than traditional 
piston engines. The Me262 did prove to be an effective fighter due to its raw speed, but 
it could not be produced in large enough number to turn the tide of the air war; the 
production capabilities of the Reich had been irrecoverably damaged by the bombing 
campaign.68  
Me262s were actually produced in relative safety. In response to the destruction 
of German factories a large factory was built into Germany’s Kohnstein Mountain using 
labor from nearby concentration camps in late 1943, thus shielding the 1,270,000 
square feet of production space from Allied bombing.69 The Mittelwerk site produced 
both Me262s as well as V2 rockets for the duration of the war. Interestingly, the 262 
used unrefined aircraft fuel for propulsion rather than the refined fuels used by its 
predecessors. Using lower grade fuel helped to offset the fact that early jet engines 
consumed much more fuel than piston engines, and destruction of fuel refining facilities 
contributed to the need of the Me262.70 Although jet aircraft did allow Germany to 
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increase fighter production, this came at a point in the war in which Allied air superiority 
was assured, and served only to expend more resources in a losing battle.71 
Superior technology and aircraft design were key components of the Allied 
victory in the skies, but the quality of pilot produced by the Allied nations also became 
increasingly superior to their foes as the war progressed, and cannot be discounted as 
a major factor in determining air superiority.72 In fact, post-war study determined that the 
majority of pilots lost during the war were inexperienced or poorly trained, and those 
who received ample training time almost always outperformed and outlasted other 
pilots.73 
The American pilot training program was a two phase endeavor. Initial flying 
training consisted of classroom instruction and 75 hours of flight time in training aircraft. 
From there, pilots moved on to advanced flight school, where they were assigned to 
train in specific aircraft that they would fly in combat. Although preferences in aircraft 
were taken into account for top students, most were assigned aircraft based on skills 
and traits demonstrated during basic flight training. Height and weight of pilots was also 
taken into account, with smaller men being assigned to fighters to improve 
maneuverability, and larger pilots to bombers who did not rely on aerial agility to 
accomplish their objectives. This provided an advantage as American pilots were better 
suited to their aircraft than their German foes.74 In advanced training, fighter pilots 
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received an additional minimum seventy-five hours of flight time while bomber pilots 
received eighty-six.  
As the war progressed, instructor quality also vastly improved as early-war 
veterans returned stateside to instruct their replacements.75 By March 1945 over 90 
percent of the instructors were combat veterans. Gunnery was considered the most 
important skill a pilot could learn during training.76 Hitting a foe’s aircraft was a difficult 
task, especially at the high speed aircraft of the era. When compared to slower aircraft 
of the previous war, aerial marksmanship became the most important factor in 
separating good pilots from great ones. Because of the vast manpower available to the 
American military, those with sub-standard scores in basic or advanced training could 
be eliminated from the program. This ensured not only an efficient use of military 
resources, but also saved the lives of skilled pilots relying on wingmen, and the lives of 
those who would have been easily shot down.77 
As American pilot training became increasingly effective, Luftwaffe training 
became decidedly less so. Because of German demands for manpower and skilled 
pilots during the war, their instructor program also suffered. Due to losses during the 
Battle of Stalingrad alone 600 instructors were sent to the Eastern Front.78 By 1943 the 
Luftwaffe began suffering from an instructor shortage that had a marked effect on pilot 
ability and the number trained per year. In addition to this, German training facilities 
often came under aerial attack, while training facilities in the US were completely 
shielded from enemy assault in the same manner that American factories were. As the 
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war progressed, required hours for German pilots continuously fell, thus lowering the 
quality of trained pilot, while those for Allied pilots rose to increase pilot effectiveness as 
pilot demand decreased.79 
 
 Regardless of how it was achieved, the deployment of an air-centric strategy by 
the Allies resulting in total and ultimate victory during Second World War proved that air 
superiority was the determining factor in modern conflict. Much can be said of early war 
German success in blitzkrieg strategy centering on tank superiority and mechanized 
infantry for rapid advance, but these gains were all made with total air superiority over 
inferior air forces to cover the advances. Ultimately air superiority as the determining 
factor in Allied victory can be simplified into one statement. When Germany held control 
of the skies they knew nothing but success, but upon losing that control to the Allies, 
they knew naught but defeat. Thus, whichever power held control of the skies, held 
control of the war. 
Chapter II: The Airborne as an extension of Air Power 
In addition to strategic bombing, the deployment of airborne forces is an 
extension of air superiority. Once aerial dominance has been established over a specific 
region planes can drop men, rather than bombs, upon the enemy. This provides great 
tactical flexibility in operational planning, as evidenced by both Allied and German 
efforts throughout the war. The purpose of this section is to analyze the impact of 
airborne forces on the war in Europe. From that analysis, it will become apparent that 
airborne forces, as an extension of air superiority, did serve a vital role in securing 
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victory for the Allies. It will do so by first analyzing the German use of airborne forces in 
the early stages of the war, and the latter Allied measures which deployed airborne 
units more often and more effectively. 
The development of airborne forces did not truly begin until the late interwar 
period. Although the Italians used parachutes to drop saboteurs behind enemy lines as 
early as 1918, the aircraft to deploy entire infantry detachments were not feasible during 
the First World War. Because of this, the creation of airborne infantry units did not take 
form until the 1930’s. During this decade, the Soviet Union began airborne exercises, 
which inspired Nazi leadership, particularly Hermann Göring, to develop their own 
paratroop units. These units were considered elite forces in the German military, and 
were given increased training and advanced weaponry befitting of their status.80 
As with most new technologies, the use of airborne forces did not come without 
growing pains. The German invasion of Crete during Operation Mercury was the first 
invasion in history to use only airborne forces. Although ultimately successful in taking 
the island, the invasion was marred with difficulties and resulted in immense casualties 
for the German Fallschirmjägers.  
On May 1st, 1941 General Kurt Student was ordered to prepare his elite 
paratroopers for an airborne invasion of the Greek island of Crete. Germany had 
already deployed her paratroopers in the Netherlands during the Battle for The Hague, 
and the units had successfully captured target Dutch airfields but with heavy losses. 
Student was expected to conduct an even greater operation with only twenty days of 
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preparation.81 To further compound the difficulty of preparing an offensive operation 
against an entrenched island defender, the necessary Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft 
for the invasion did not arrive until May 15th, and the necessary fuel did not until the 
20th.82 Because of this the German paratroopers were unable to conduct practice 
“jumps” beforehand.83 The invasion was initially scheduled to begin on the 15th, and the 
lack of resources necessitated a postponement until the 21st.  
The haste of the operation required the Fallschirmjägers to assist ground crews 
in the fueling of their aircraft during the night before the invasion, and were given 
amphetamines to compensate for their lack of sleep.84 On the morning of the invasion 
yet another hindrance to the operation appeared. The German transports were 
stationed at captured Greek airfields, most of which were no more than dirt or sand 
airstrips. Because of this, huge dust clouds would be created from the takeoff of even 
one transport, and so instead of rapid successive takeoff the pilots had to wait an 
average of seventeen minutes on the ground to wait for visibility.85 The properly 
constructed airfields with paved or grass runways were occupied by Luftwaffe fighter 
and bomber aircraft which were given priority over the transports. 
Pre-invasion bombardment succeeded in forcing RAF aircraft on the island to 
relocate, thus securing air superiority for the offensive, but they had failed to knock out 
the majority of Allied anti-aircraft positions on the island, and as a result one third of the 
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Ju-52s were downed over Crete.86 Pre-invasion bombing of the landing zones created 
large smoke clouds which obscured the view of glider and transport pilots, and caused 
the scattering of attacking forces. Once the German paratroopers and glider infantry 
made landfall, they were met with stiff resistance from Greek and British forces 
stationed on the island. Allied defenders numbered 42,000 and, in contrast with their 
attackers, prepared extensively for an airborne invasion, concealing most of their gun 
positions around likely landing zones.87 
The German invasion plan numbered approximately 23,000 infantryman, 
however 7,000 of those were to attack the island via a naval invasion, and were halted 
by the British navy. That left the remaining 16,000 airborne infantrymen, who originally 
were meant to secure and hold key positions in preparation for the beach landings, to 
secure the island in its totality.88 This lofty goal was again complicated by lack of 
significant air support. Although the skies were clear of Allied aircraft, the majority of 
German bombers and fighters in the area were diverted to the East for the impending 
invasion of Russia.89 They did so at the cost of 6,000 casualties, causing 9,000 Allied 
casualties and capturing an additional 17,000. Remaining Allied soldiers escaped the 
island by sea, as the Royal Navy maintained control of the seas around the island until 
the defenders were forced to withdraw.90 
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Hitler was personally dissuaded from conducting any further offensive airborne 
operations as a result of the Pyrrhic victory that was the invasion of Crete.91 The cost of 
replacing the necessary aircraft, and the men trained to fly and jump from them, was too 
great for Germany to afford as the war dragged on and her industrial capacity began to 
wane. As a result, the Fallschirmjägers became a leg-infantry unit in all but name.92 
They were deployed throughout the remainder of the war in the West in defensive roles. 
By winter 1944, the majority of Fallschirmjägers were no longer jump qualified, and the 
manpower drain on Germany reduced the once elite ranks of the units to old men and 
young boys.93 
German airborne operation had at the very best mixed results, and at their worst 
were abject failures of both planning and execution. Logic dictates that Allied 
commanders would be dissuaded from attempting similar operations. However, they 
saw the German failures as just that; German failures. Their shortcomings could be 
improved upon to realize the strategic flexibility that airborne infantry lend to offensive 
operations. As a result, Anglo-American airborne doctrine was synthesized. Their tactics 
depended upon paratroopers to serve as the main fighting force, while gliders towed to 
the battlefield bring additional reinforcement, ammunition, and heavy equipment such as 
jeeps, mortars, and small anti-tank guns that were too heavy to deliver via parachute.94  
The first major Allied airborne operations of the war coincided with the first major 
engagement of American forces in Europe. Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North 
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Africa through Tunisia, was a naval invasion complimented by parachute infantry. The 
509th Parachute Infantry Regiment was assigned two primary objectives during the 
operation. Airfields at Tafraoui and La Sénia, (15 and 5 miles South of Oran 
respectively) were to be secured in conjunction with the landings.95 Due to the extreme 
range of the operation, (approximately 1100 miles from London to Tunisia) and poor 
weather over Spain, transport pilots were unable to navigate to their drop zones.96 This 
forced thirty of the thirty-seven transports to land in a dry lakebed far to the West of their 
objectives. Despite this, both objectives were taken within acceptable timeframes.97  
Allied commanders would take several key lessons from Operation Torch with 
regards to airborne operations. First, operations of extreme range could not be 
expected to arrive at precise drop zones, and wide unit dispersal would have to be 
taken into account. As a result, major operations of such extreme ranges would not be 
attempted for the remainder of the war. Second, clear weather was a necessity for 
transport pilots to navigate. This lesson is evidenced by the postponements of the 
Normandy landings due to poor weather over the English Channel. Finally, and most 
importantly, the success of the airborne units to capture their objectives despite the 
many obstacles served as a proof of concept. This emboldened Allied war planners 
such as Eisenhower and Montgomery to include air assaults in future operations. 
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For good reason, the most well-known airborne operation of the war is that of the 
D-Day invasion. In addition to the landings on the coast of Normandy 10,000 aircraft 
filled the skies over France, with over 1,000 of them carrying paratrooper and glider 
infantry.98 Their objective was to drop in behind the German coastal defenses and 
capture key points to prevent an immediate counterattack on forces landing on the 
beaches later that morning. The British 6th, American 82nd, and American 101st Airborne 
Divisions were used to create this “shield” between the beaches and German 
counterattack.99 Many of these key points were bridges that would also be held to 
prevent German destruction in attempts to slow the Allied advance. Specifically, British 
units targeted river crossings over the Caen Canal, Orne River, and Dives River.100 
 By the time the invasion plan was put into action, British airborne units had 
completed forty-three practice jumps over England, and had practiced night-time bridge 
assault tactics for weeks.101 The glider units touched down at twenty minutes past 
midnight on the morning of June 6th, and were followed by paratroopers at 12:50AM and 
a second wave of gliders carrying reinforcements and heavy weapons at 3:30AM. Lack 
of communication between units plagued the early stages of the invasion, as many 
pieces of radio equipment were lost or destroyed upon landing.102 In addition, cloud 
cover and heavy anti-aircraft fire caused scattering of airborne forces.103  
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The airborne infantrymen were able to overcome these setbacks, and capture 
their objectives due to a key development in their training following the lessons of 
Operation Torch. Airborne units were trained to act independently in the case of lack of 
communication, and if unable to locate or capture their objectives were given general 
orders to harass and destroy German units they encountered to cause disruption in the 
defense.104 This was done to great effect in Normandy, as scattered groups of infantry, 
often comprised of men from several different units, identified the key objectives nearest 
to them and fought to secure them even if it was not their pre-invasion goal. 
The D-Day plans that were put in motion in June 1944 deployed airborne units 
more conservatively than many high-level Allied commanders desired. Among them 
was American Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall. Marshall, and American 
Army Air Corps commander General Arnold proposed an airborne landing much further 
inland than was planned.105  
[In Reference to his so-called “Plan C”]…Establishes an air-head in keeping with my 
ideas on the subject, one that can be quickly established and developed to great 
strength in forty-eight hours. The area generally south of Evreux has been selected 
because of four excellent airfields. 
This plan appeals to me because I feel that it is a true vertical envelopment and would 
create such a strategic threat to the Germans that it would call for a major revision of 
their defensive plans. It should be a complete surprise, an invaluable asset of any such 
plan. It would directly threaten the crossings of the Seine as well as the city of Paris. It 
should serve as a rallying point for considerable elements of the French underground. 
In effect, we would be opening another front in France and your buildup would be 
tremendously increased in rapidity.106 
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Marshall sent two staff officers to present Arnold’s proposal to Eisenhower and 
his staff in February 1944, and received the following report from them. “...decision had 
been made not to use the airborne effort initially as we were proposing, but to use it 
directly to assist the beach landing and main effort particularly to capture Cherbourg as 
soon as possible.”107 Eisenhower also personally responded to Marshall with the 
following, “My initial reaction to the specific proposal is that I agree thoroughly with the 
conception but disagree with the timing.”108 The Arnold and Marshall’s proposal was 
theoretically sound in the eyes of the Supreme Allied Commander, which lends his 
voice to the effectiveness of the allied airborne infantry. After the war, Marshall 
lamented Eisenhower’s decision to not deploy the airborne more aggressively. 
“…the quick way to end the battle—and that was to seize a field near Paris with glider 
planes, with parachute troops, and then fly in these small tractors and other things, and 
then gather in all the motor transport of the surrounding country and, of course, all the 
French undercover units would have joined us and built up there with the ammunition. . . 
. We could put in 105 [mm] guns and build up a force there right behind the German line 
before they had time to get things together, and make it almost impossible for them to 
do anything but to fight you with small groups. However, that was a hazard. It was a 
brand new thing and Eisenhower’s staff and Eisenhower, I guess, himself didn’t feel that 
it was proper to take the risk. But I always thought it was wrong to divide up the men 
into little groups everywhere. . . . I believe the air could have been used with great effect 
in splitting up the Germans very quickly at the start.”109 
With the opinions of generals Marshall, Arnold, and (to an extent) Eisenhower, it 
can be argued with great support that the airborne forces deployed during the 
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Normandy invasion were done so too conservatively, and that a more aggressive would 
have made their success even more vital to the outcome of the operation than it already 
was, and hastened the end of the war. General Marshal’s proposal, if employed and 
properly executed, would have resulted in the encirclement of a large portion of the 
German army in France. The envelopment and forced surrender of these units would 
prevent them from being used in the defense against the Allied push into France. 
Marshal’s airborne operation plan circumvents the long breakout from the Normandy 
beachhead that slowed the Allied advance. Such an aggressive deployment of airborne 
units posed great risk, but was within the realm of reason in the minds of many Allied 
commanders, and held the potential for an immense strategic victory. 
Ultimately, the D-Day plan was successful in establishing an Allied foothold on 
the European mainland. The success of the operation did however result in widening 
the divisions amongst the Anglo-American command structure, as evidenced in the 
words of General Omar Bradley. 
“...the frustration they [the British] experienced here at Caen produced an 
extreme sensitivity to Patton’s speedy advance across France. In setting the stage for 
our breakout the British were forced to endure the barbs of critics who shamed them for 
failing to push out as vigorously as the Americans did. The intense rivalry that afterward 
strained relations between the British and American commands might be said to have 
sunk its psychological roots into that passive mission of the British on the 
beachhead.”110  
Following the Normandy invasion, the next major use of air assault troops would 
take place during Operation Market Garden. The controversy surrounding the failure of 
the operation is twofold, first in the strategic planning of the operation itself, which was 
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marred by infighting between American and British commanders as referenced above, 
and in the tactical failures of the operation once it was put into effect.111  
 Market Garden was the brainchild of General Bernard Montgomery, and was an 
extension of his “Narrow Thrust” philosophy.112 He proposed a bold operation to cross 
the Rhine in Holland through a massive airborne assault that would secure key bridges 
for the armored ground assault comprising the second arm of the operation. 
Montgomery’s plan required other allied advances along the front to halt so that the 
bottlenecked supplies coming through Normandy could be funneled to his command to 
support such a large advance, a decision that was vehemently opposed by American 
commanders such as Patton, but was approved by Eisenhower nonetheless.113 His plan 
was seen at the time, and by many scholars today, as an attempt to increase his own 
importance within the Allied push into France. By focusing airborne operations on the 
town of Arnhem, approximately 90 kilometers from the Allied lines,114 he ensured that 
command of the operation, and thus credit for it, would fall to his staff rather than the 
American forces to the south. Ultimately, this would prove to be the plan’s undoing, as 
the objective bridges were too far from and too heavily defended for his units to push 
through from the Allied line and cross successfully. 
 The operation was the largest airborne assault (in terms of manpower) 
undertaken in history, with 35,000 American, British, and Polish troops attacking 
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Nijmegen and Arnhem by air.115 Such a large operation double the numbers of transport 
aircraft that the Allies had available at the time, and necessitated the airborne landings 
be spread out over three days (September 17-20th).116 The jumps over Holland during 
Market Garden showed incredible improvement in accuracy over those even of just a 
few months prior, and the majority of airborne troops landed on are nearby their landing 
zones. This allowed for the initial resounding success of Market Garden, as the airborne 
forces secured all of their assigned bridges rapidly.117 
The downfall of the operation began on September 21st when German panzer 
divisions began a counterattack against the British forces at Arnhem, which held out 
against the armored onslaught without heavy antitank weaponry in anticipation of relief 
from their own armored ground units pushing north which never came.118 Ground forces 
had tremendous difficulty closing the gap between themselves and the airborne forces 
at Arnhem and Nijmegen due to the reliance on a single road as their avenue of 
advance; the German defense thus centered around holding off the advance along this 
road which became known as ‘Hell’s Highway’.119 The commander of American ground 
forces involved in the push remarked that the reliance on the road was like "threading 
seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in 
trouble."120 
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 Operation Market Garden was not an abject failure as this would suggest. At the 
time, many felt otherwise, including Winston Churchill who labeled the operation “a 
decided victory.”121 Montgomery himself also stated that the operation was “ninety 
percent successful” which speaks to how close the goals of the operation game to 
fruition.122 A strategic success of Market Garden independent of the operation’s 
outcome was that by bringing the German Army in Holland to battle while Germany was 
struggling to maintain combat effectiveness across their multiple fronts, it weakened the 
army in Holland significantly. This would work to Allied advantage in future offensive 
operations that crossed into Germany in 1945.123  
Hypothetically, a similar operation, which targeted crossings closer to the Allied 
lines, (and thus closer to American ground forces) holds a higher chance for success. 
This, coupled with Eisenhower’s agreement to Montgomery’s plan makes the concept of 
an airborne-led Rhine crossing a sound one. In 1945, a similar plan, though not to so 
great a scale, would be implemented for the Allied crossing of the Rhine. 
 Operation Plunder was the name given to the crossing of the Rhine in 1945, and 
was supported by the final great airborne operation of the war entitled Operation 
Varsity. Airborne units taking off from Britain and the continent jumped into Germany to 
aid the Allied crossing of the Rhine on March 23rd-24th 1945. Operation Varsity 
involved over 16,000 airborne troops and concentrated the entire assault force at 
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Wesel.124 It is the largest airborne operation in history to be conducted in one day at one 
location, as unlike Market Garden the entire airborne force landed on the same day at 
drop zones adjacent to one another.125 Unlike previous Allied airborne operations, the 
entire undertaking was done during the daylight. Although this cost higher casualties in 
the landings due to antiaircraft fire, the accuracy of the landings were incredibly 
precise.126 
 As with previous airborne operations, the forces were assigned key bridges and 
crossroads in and around Wesel as their primary objectives to aid the Allied ground 
forces on the opposite side of the Rhine in advancing into Germany once they crossed 
over.127 Varsity was unique however in that the gliders towed to the battlefield which 
typically were each assigned their own tow plane were instead paired with another 
glider on one tow plane. In addition, paratrooper units had previously only jumped from 
one side of their transport C-47s, but during Varsity the transports were outfitted with an 
additional jump door on the other side which allowed for both a doubling of the drop rate 
of the paratroopers as well as halving their dispersal over the drop zone.128 Learning 
from the failures of Market Garden, the airborne drop zones were also much closer to 
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Allied lines, which greatly reduced the amount of time they would have to hold out with 
only aerial resupply.129 
 Operation Varsity, and consequently Operation Plunder, were resounding 
successes. Eisenhower remarked that it was "the most successful airborne operation 
carried out to date."130 Adding to Eisenhower’s resounding endorsement of the 
operation was the official report given by Major General Matthew Ridgeway which 
hailed the operation as “flawless”, and that two airborne divisions eliminated German 
defenses in hours which would have taken days to do otherwise.131 
 Several key differences are evident between the successful Allied airborne 
operations and the failed German assault on Crete. First, Allied air assaults were 
products of meticulous planning and preparation. This is best shown in the contrast 
between the years of preparation in prelude to the Normandy invasion compared to the 
twenty days, (without his aircraft or fuel) Student was given to prepare for the Crete 
assault. In addition, Allied airborne forces were always deployed as part of a greater 
battle plan, and were not relied upon to accomplish goals without proper support, unlike 
the invaders of Crete who had to accomplish the difficult task of capturing a well-
defended island without the benefit of naval support or a well-supplied beachhead. 
Although both enjoyed air superiority, which is a pre-requisite for airborne assaults, the 
Allies used attack aircraft in much greater conjunction with their airborne forces than the 
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Germans. As with any other form of ground infantry, this provided an incredible boon to 
the Allied airborne forces. Finally, Allied commanders showed a willingness to continue 
to improve airborne operations as the war progressed, and did not abandon the concept 
after early difficulties. The immense resources and productive capacities of the Allies 
gave them the opportunity to train more men and replace lost aircraft which Germany 
was incapable of doing. 
 Even the failed Operation Market Garden was seen by many as a success on the 
part of the airborne forces. In the contrast that is evident between the German failures, 
and the Allied successes a concise truth emerges. When given the prerequisites of 
proper planning, support, and leadership, airborne forces were not only an extremely 
weapon in the arsenal of the Allies, but a necessary one. Although it can be argued, and 
perhaps correctly so, that the war would inevitably end in an Allied victory by the time 
airborne forces saw heavy deployment in 1944, an argument that not using these forces 
and dedicating the resources elsewhere could have led to a swifter end to the war is 
without merit. Even if the role of Devil’s advocate is taken as correct, that somehow the 
resources would have been better spent elsewhere, the casualties necessary for the 
Allied forces to establish a foothold in Western Europe through a D-Day style invasion 
would have resulted in far greater casualties without the “airborne shield” protecting the 
beachhead. A massed German counterattack in Normandy unimpeded by airborne 
forces held the potential for reversing the outcome of the operation, prolonging the war 
for months if not years. This operation, and the success of others like it serve as 
sufficient proof of the integral role of the airborne in the liberation of Europe. 
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 The deployment of airborne troops is perhaps one of the great signifiers that air 
superiority has been established over a battlespace. If shot down, a bomber on a 
strategic raid may cost the lives of eight or so men. However, a troop transport filled 
with paratroopers would cost dozens. Thousands of men were dropped from the sky 
during the D-Day landings, and thousands more during Market Garden. Neither 
operation would have been planned, let alone executed, without total confidence that 
the large formations of transport aircraft would be safe from persecution by enemy 
fighters. Therefore, it can be plainly seen that the airborne both signified the Allied 
dominance of the air in Europe by 1944, as well as show the benefits that such 
dominance can reap through the successes of the D-Day landings and Operation 
Varsity. 
Chapter III: The Eastern Front 
The war on the Eastern Front brings to mind epic imagery of massive tank battles 
on rolling plains and street to street fighting in the city of Stalingrad. What is often 
overlooked in mainstream discussions of the conflict between Germany and the Soviet 
Union is the unquestionable impact of the battle in the skies that raged above 
throughout these famous events. 
On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, the German Luftwaffe held superiority over 
the antiquated Soviet VVS (Voyenno Vozdushnye Sily, translated to ‘Military Air Force’). 
When the German invasion commenced in June of 1941, the VVS had vast numerical 
superiority over the Luftwaffe, however the technological gap between the two 
organizations left the VVS far outmatched. Germany began her assault into the Soviet 
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Union with approximately 2,800 aircraft.132 Due to the secretive nature of Soviet wartime 
recordkeeping, a precise number of Soviet aircraft at the onset of the war is currently 
unknown, although it is thought to be within the range of 6,000 to 10,000133 aircraft. Of 
this number, only 17% were of technological parity with the Luftwaffe.134 
The superiority of the German aircraft over the quantitatively superior Soviets is 
evidenced by the staggering losses inflicted upon the Russians in the opening moves of 
Barbarossa. Estimates of lost Soviet planes on the first day of the invasion range from 
1,200 to 3,000 aircraft.135 The element of surprise enjoyed by the Germans and 
confusion within Soviet command at the beginning of the attack greatly contributed to 
this success, as many of the aircraft were destroyed or captured on the ground before 
they could be sent into battle.  
A later Luftwaffe report further claimed Soviet losses to number 6,233 planes by 
the second week of July 1941.136 Soviet documents confirm the massive blow, and 
report that by mid-July the Soviet VVS consisted of only 2,516 aircraft. To further 
compound this issue, less than 1,900 of the remaining aircraft were serviceable.137 In 
total this left the Soviet Union with less than 20% of its initial air force in less than a 
month of combat. 
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Luftwaffe ace Dieter Hrabak, recipient of both the Knight’s Cross and Iron Cross 
describes the heavy advantage he and his fellow pilots enjoyed over the Soviets early in 
the war: 
“I must say that the really experienced Russians thoroughly trained in peacetime 
were killed off in the first three months of the invasion. Those that remained flew 
obsolete aircraft such as the Tupolev SB, which we called the "Martin bomber," and 
Ilyushin DB-3 bombers, as well as old Polikarpov I-15 and I-16 "Rata" fighters, and used 
no tactics whatsoever. Furthermore, the Russians lacked the technical training and 
combat skill that the British had mastered, at least early in the war. The Russians had 
no stomach for prolonged dogfighting, unlike the British.”138 
The development which left to these striking results within the opening salvos of 
the German invasion is not a tale of German technological genius, but rather of a 
doctrinal shift in Soviet thinking that led to early disaster. The Soviet VVS was among 
the most technologically advanced in the world in the early 1930’s. Just as they had 
been pioneers during the First World War, (the Russian military was the first to use 
aircraft as a forward ‘spotter’ for rear artillery), the Russians spent the early 1930’s 
developing new tactics such as paratrooper infantry units, as well as engineering 
modern aircraft. Stalin’s infamous purge of the mid 1930’s reversed this trend. As high-
ranking military theorists and aircraft designers were stripped from the ranks of the 
Soviet military, it forced a shift in doctrine from innovation to quantity.139 As a result, the 
Soviet air force shifted from an innovative body to a numerically superior but 
technologically outclassed onslaught by the turn of the decade.140 
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Following the embarrassing Pyrrhic victory over Finland in the Winter War of 
1939-1940, Stalin began an effort to modernize the Soviet military. The Soviet VVS was 
an integral part of this effort.141 The program was nowhere near completion at the time 
of Barbarossa, though was well underway by 1941 and greatly contributed to the 
eventual turning of the tide in the air. New aircraft such as the Ilyushin II-2, a heavily 
armed and armored ground attack aircraft, and the Yakovlev Yak-1 fighter, which at the 
time was the only Soviet fighter capable of outmatching the Bf 109, were just begging to 
arrive in number. These and other aircraft which were beginning mass production as a 
result of Stalin’s initiative would comprise the bulk of Soviet produced aircraft during the 
war. 
In contrast to the immense quantitative losses in the Soviet VVS, the Luftwaffe 
lost 460 aircraft in June and 695 in July.142 Although these losses rightly suggest the 
superiority of the Luftwaffe at this point in the war, they also mark the beginning of the 
problem that would ultimately prove the Luftwaffe’s undoing: an inability to replace 
losses. The near 1,200 aircraft lost in the first two months comprised nearly half of the 
Luftwaffe strength in the east. As the Allied pressure on German industry from the West 
began to outpace the production demands in the East in the coming years the German 
war industry was unable to replenish the Luftwaffe pre-Barbarossa strength, just as it 
had been unable to fully replenish itself after the losses over Britain in 1940. The ability 
of the Soviets to replenish their immense losses from a seemingly endless supply of 
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men and material, and inability of the Germans to do the same, that has so famously 
typified the ground war is also true of the battle for the skies above Eastern Europe. 
Until the Soviet industry and aircraft production fully mobilized against the 
German invasion, foreign aircraft served as an invaluable stopgap. Fighter and bomber 
aircraft from the United States, and to a lesser extent Britain, provided Soviet pilots 
modern aircraft with which to combat the Luftwaffe and ultimately halt the Nazi advance. 
Nearly as soon as the initial losses suffered by the VVS became apparent, the 
Soviet Union reached out to the United States in hopes of securing aircraft to bolster its 
crumbling defenses. Constantine Oumansky, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, 
sent a 9-Point list of requests to President Roosevelt asking for military aid. Among 
other things, this list asked for 3,000 fighter aircraft and an additional 3,000 bombers.143 
If such an order was fulfilled it would have given the Soviets an immediate 
overwhelming advantage over the Luftwaffe. However, it was well beyond the capacity 
of the United States to provide so many planes so rapidly.  
Soviet requests for American aircraft and material came only three months after 
the US passed the Lend-Lease Act to support Britain, and a great deal of popular 
support existed to support the Soviets as well. However, this was out of hope that the 
Communists and Fascists would “bleed each-other dry” instead of seen as an act 
defending democracy as the Lend-Lease was. Regardless of the reason, the support 
handed President Roosevelt a mandate to support the Russians. This sentiment was 
not shared by many high-level officers of the American military. General Geroge C. 
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Marshall expressed in a memorandum to General ‘Hap’ Arnold vehement opposition to 
sending aircraft to the USSR due to a severe lack of aircraft in the US military, 
particularly in the Philippines to counter growing Japanese aggression.144 The initial wild 
successes of the invasion also led many to assume that the Soviets would soon 
capitulate to the Germans, and that sending material supplies to the Russians would 
ultimately result in aid sent to the Reich.145 
The reservations held by Marshall and others in the United States were not 
without merit. The US was already committing a great deal of resources to the British 
rather than its own military. Since the summer of 1940, the British had received more 
American-produced aircraft in aid than the US Army Air Corps did for its own use.146 On 
July 31st a Soviet Diplomatic mission met with President Roosevelt to negotiate aircraft 
aid. Roosevelt promised to send the USSR two-hundred P-40 fighter aircraft, one 
hundred and fifty of which were already in Britain and another fifty in the United 
States.147 Meeting such an order would in essence totally deplete the Army of their P-
40’s, which was at the time the Americans’ best fighter in production. If the 200 
serviceable P-40’s were to be shipped to the USSR, that would leave only eight P-40’s 
in the US ready for deployment.148  
The first US aid was sent to the USSR on October 1st, and was mainly industrial 
material and supplies. On this same day, the three major powers agreed to the Moscow 
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Protocol, which stipulated that the US would provide on a monthly basis one-hundred 
fighters and one-hundred bombers to the Soviet Union, with Britain adding another two-
hundred monthly fighters through June 1942.149 This agreement was fulfilled resulting in 
nine deliveries totaling 3,600 aircraft. The early deliveries were not without challenges 
however. Early shipment came with few if any spare parts for integral aircraft 
components. This stemmed from an issue faced by the American military itself and not 
one put upon the Soviets by design.150 Despite beginning with only a token shipment, 
approximately 17% of aircraft used by the Soviets during the war were produced in the 
United States.151 
Although the Curtiss P-40 Warhawk constituted the first American aircraft 
delivery to the Soviet Union, it was the P-39 Aircobra that was sent in the greatest 
number to the East, with shipments beginning in November 1942. By July 1943 the 
number of Aircobras in use by the USSR had increased sevenfold since November of 
the previous year. Throughout the duration of the war, the US delivered between 4,719 
and 4,746 Cobras of varying models, with England shipping an additional 212, with 
Soviet records showing a total number of accepted Aircobras at 4,952.152  
The P-39 was a multipurpose aircraft capable of both close air support as well as 
aerial dogfighting. In this respect, it was the perfect aircraft to be sent to the Soviet 
Union, as its versatility allowed for mass generalized training for the aircraft and did not 
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require separate training for designated fighter or ground-support pilots. In 1942, a 
Soviet engineering commission deemed the P-39 as the equal of both German and 
Soviet aircraft in its class, with excellent maneuverability and armament.153 The P-39’s 
heavy armament gave it the much needed capability to attack hard targets, such as 
German heavy tanks and fortified structures. The heated cabin, atypical of Soviet 
aircraft, also made it a favorite of Russian pilots.154 The experience of the ‘Cobra’ on the 
Eastern front lasted from 1942 until the war’s conclusion, and the success of the aircraft 
and its impact on turning the tide against the Luftwaffe is emblematic of the tremendous 
impact that the Allied aircraft sent to the USSR had on the Eastern Front. 
The majority of air-to-air combat on the Eastern Front occurred between 4,000 
and 5,000 meters. At this elevation the Aircobra outperformed contemporary Soviet and 
Luftwaffe aircraft which reached peak performance and different altitudes.155 Because of 
this, Luftwaffe pilots reported engaging the P-39 only when enjoying numerical 
superiority.156 Soviet aircraft distribution also shows that P-39 equipped units were most 
often stationed towards the front while rear units used British Hurricane and American 
Kittyhawk fighter aircraft. Although regarded as obsolete by British and American pilots, 
many Soviet pilots remained adamant that the P-39 was the superior aircraft of the war 
due to its high armament.157 
                                               
153 Kulikov, 16. 
154 Kulikov, 16. 
155 Kulikov, 19. 
156 Kulikov, 19. 
157 Kulikov, 19. 
 53 
 
The Aircobra first saw combat in the East on May 15th 1942 under the 1st 
Squadron of the 19th Guard IAP over the Karelian front in an indecisive engagement 
without any victories or losses. The following day against eight Bf 109s the first Aircobra 
loss in the East was suffered, with the pilot surviving but with serious wounds upon a 
crash-landing. The first major victory for the aircraft was on June 15th when six Cobras 
from the 19th Guard intercepted a German sortie of six bombers and sixteen escort 
fighters, downing nine enemy aircraft without any losses of their own.158 
At the end of June 1942 the 153d IAP Regiment arrived at Voronezhski outfitted 
with Aircobras. In four months of combat the group flew 1,070 missions, with 64 downed 
enemy aircraft (45 of them fighters) and only eight losses of their own.159 Colonel 
Mironov, the commander of 153d attributed his men’s success against the Germans to 
both their flying ability as well as the superior performance of the Cobra against German 
aircraft.160 
On April 14, 1943 in the defense of the key port of Murmansk, the 2d Guard SAP 
repelled a German air-raid with ten Aircobras I fighters and an additional six British-
made Hawker Hurricanes. Facing fourteen German fighters they scored five victories 
and lost only one plane.161 The Aircobra I was inferior to newer P-39D’s that the US had 
begun sending the USSR in November 1942, but all combat-capable aircraft were 
needed by the Soviets to establish air-parity, and eventually dominance over, the 
Luftwaffe. 
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In one sortie in September 1943, twelve pilots from the 19th Guard IAD destroyed 
13 German locomotives. The P-39’s high caliber cannons were able to penetrate and 
destroy the boiler engines of the trains.162 February 1944 saw the pilots of the 9th Guard 
IAP destroy 13 German planes, 110 motor vehicles, 100 horses, 5 steam locomotives, 
and an unknown but high number of infantry.163 These numbers highlight the role-shift 
of the P-39 from a multipurpose aircraft to a dedicated ground-attack plane that 
occurred in mid-1943 in part due to the deployment of modern Soviet-produced fighter 
aircraft. The total war-record of the P-39 in the East proves the effectiveness of the 
aircraft. One P-39 was lost per 122 combat sorties, with four enemy aircraft downed 
during that time on average.164 The P-39 saw such great success that the Soviets also 
purchased 2,400 Bell P-63 ‘Kingcobras’, a modernized design based upon its 
predecessor, from 1943 to 1945.165   
Once the Soviet war economy was mass-producing modern natively designed 
aircraft, such as the Yak-1 fighter designed during Stalin’s pre-war modernization effort, 
the Luftwaffe had lost its large qualitative advantage over the Soviets. The attrition 
inflicted as a result of these new aircraft as well as the mass-production of them 
widened the numerical gap between the VVS and the Luftwaffe. It is no mere 
coincidence that the greatest successes of the German Wehrmacht in the East occurred 
when the Luftwaffe was at its strongest. This shift in power in the air fueled by the 
industrial might of the Soviet Union would in turn shift the war in the east. 
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Germany had planned for a swift victory over the Soviets at the onset of their 
Eastern campaign. The ‘rotten structure’ that Hitler labeled the Soviet Union did in fact 
not collapse when the door was kicked in. The failure of Operation Barbarossa to force 
a Soviet surrender in 1941 split created a prolonged two-front war that divided German 
resources. Germany was thus forced to attempt another offensive to seize badly 
needed resources and perhaps end the war in the East. 
Hitler’s 1942 campaign known as “Case Blue” was meant to solve Germany’s 
increasingly mounting oil deficiency by capturing the oil-rich Soviet Caucasus.166 Hitler 
stressed the importance of this offensive when he remarked on June 1st 1942 “If I do not 
get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must end this war.”167 
The Luftwaffe’s mission during the offensive was to provide close air support for 
the advancing two armies. In addition, Hitler ordered that “The early destruction of 
Stalingrad is especially important.” Bombing raids on enemy railways and pipelines 
were also ordered but special care was to be taken to avoid bombing the refineries 
themselves.168 As a whole the offensive was to be split into two separate campaigns in 
turn split the Luftwaffe’s resources. This division of resources between the southern 
Crimean offensive and push to Stalingrad ran counter to the previously successful 
German strategy of Shchwerpunkt.169 This doctrine emphasized a single point of effort 
as the spearhead of an assault. The division of Luftwaffe aircraft to support each army 
                                               
166 Joel Hayward. "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to 
Damage Soviet Oil Production." The Journal of Military History 64, no. 3 (2000) 769. 
167 Hayward, 771. 
168 Hayward, 777. 
169 Hayward, 784. 
 56 
 
separately only increased the growing Soviet numerical advantage in the skies.170 In 
turn this left the majority of German ground forces without proper air support, with the 
exception of the 6th Army at Stalingrad due to Hitler’s obsession with the target.171 
The initial offensive appeared successful with the capture of the first major 
objective of Krasnodar with support from the Fourth Air Corps. The wing’s commanding 
officer remarked in his diary on August 8th that the “Bombers performed extremely well 
against thick enemy columns there.”172 However, with the capture of Krasnodar and 
later Maikop it became apparent that the Soviets had succeeded in heavily damaging 
much of the oil production facilities there before capture.173  
The 4th Air Corps operational strength had fallen from 1,610 aircraft (with 71% of 
them combat operational) in the four weeks prior to June 20th 1942, to 1,359 (56% 
combat operational). By August 20th the number dropped to 1,071 aircraft with only 643 
(60%) operational.174 Because of this, by August 1942 the Luftwaffe was incapable of 
destroying Soviet oil production as it had been earlier in the year. However, it was still 
capable of dealing a heavy blow. 
In his interview, Hrabak discusses how the Soviet VVS evolved into an effective 
fighting force: “Later in the war, however, a new breed of Russian pilots emerged, flying 
excellent native aircraft. The best Russia had was placed in elite Red Banner fleets, and 
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they claimed many German pilots.”175 The rapidly improving VVS was far superior to its 
pre-invasion self, and the aforementioned losses show proof of this. 
On October 7th Hitler realized that the southern assault could not reach the 
Caucasus oilfields by winter, and therefore the offensive had failed to achieve its two 
primary goals.176 Luftwaffe Field Marshal Wolfram Richtofen was then ordered to attack 
the unreachable oilfields. Richtofen promptly diverted nearly every bomber from the 
Stalingrad assault to the South, but the move was made too late and with too few 
aircraft to cripple the Soviet oil supply.177 On October 10th Richtofen attacked the oil 
refineries at Grozny with his remaining bomber force. This consisted of 129 of the 
remaining 232 Luftwaffe bombers in the East (those not used were not combat-ready at 
the time). When compared to the pre-campaign bomber force of 323 serviceable 
bombers (with another 157 not combat ready), the high cost of the Fall Blau to the 
Luftwaffe becomes readily apparent.178 Despite the success of this mission, such raids 
were unsustainable. The Stalingrad sector demanded all the air resources Richtofen 
could muster in a Furher-directed last-ditch effort to save the 6th Army.179 
Although the Luftwaffe heavily damaged the fields at Grozny, it did little to 
damage the Soviet war effort as the Baku fields were left untouched. Grozny and 
Maikop combined for only 10% of Soviet oil production, and so German efforts did little 
to harm the ‘big picture’.180 Hitler’s ill-fated 1942 offensive had a sound goal in theory, 
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but was impractical even if it had succeeded. A March 1941 report by Lt. General 
Hermann von Hanneken of the War Economy and Armaments Office warned that even 
if the Caucasus was seized only 10,000 tons of oil could be transported back into 
Germany per month which would not have solved the fuel crisis.181 
The failure of the Caucasus campaign to push further into the USSR and take 
more oil fields, which would at the very least had denied the Soviets their use even if 
German oil production would have not benefited from them, was in part due to Hitler’s 
insistence of Stalingrad’s destruction.182 This tied down Luftwaffe aircraft that would 
have been better used to support the ground advance. Fliegerkorps VIII assigned to 
bomb Stalingrad achieved great destruction of the city in the opening offensive. 
However, Hitler’s insistence on repeated raids on the city resulted in what effectively 
becoming bombing rubble into smaller bits of rubble.183 This wasted both munitions and 
precious fuel the German war economy could not afford to lose, and also misallocated 
aircraft that could have assisted the southern offensive. 
In August, while the window to strike at Baku (producer of approximately 80% of 
Soviet oil) still presented itself, Hitler rather focused the Southern Luftwaffe units on 
Stalingrad to serve as “flying artillery” for the embattled 6th Army in what resulted in a 
futile gesture to take a strategically insignificant target when compared to the 
destruction of Baku.184 The Soviet VVS (Red Air Force) did not have a high 
concentration of fighters in the Caucasus in August 1942, and those stationed there 
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were mainly obsolete. This created a brief window for a German bombing campaign of 
the Baku oilfields. However, requests for more aircraft allowed the Soviets to begin 
striking back at the Germans from the air by mid-September and effectively defend the 
oilfields.185 Hitler issued orders to Richtofen to bomb the Baku refineries on October 
22nd, but the reality of this situation left the order unfollowed.186 Although successful 
raids on Baku would not have changed the outcome of the war in the East, it would 
have prolonged the lifetime of the Reich by delaying the impending Soviet 
counteroffensives. 
The failure of the 1942 offensive, as well as the later offensive against the Kursk 
salient in 1943 resulted in massive losses for both the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht. As the 
German war economy weakened from Allied bombing in the West, and was left without 
sufficient oil resources, these losses could not be replaced. In contrast, Soviet industry 
increased dramatically. This difference in production and supply opened the door for the 
Soviets to push the Germans out of the USSR, and eventually all the way to Berlin. 
Hrabak describes the war in the air as the tide began to turn: “We were sort of a fire 
brigade, as the front was always moving back and forth, and we were expected to be at 
every spot that was burning-to put out the fire, so to speak.”187  
As the Soviets pushed the Wehrmacht back into Germany, the Luftwaffe was 
decidedly outmatched by the VVS. Hrabak’s description of the desperate defense of the 
Fatherland by the Luftwaffe paints a dire picture:  “The Luftwaffe was very weak at this 
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point--with two groups JG.54 could never hope to gain air superiority against the 
mounting number of Russian aircraft.”188 With the failure of Barbarossa in 1941 and the 
‘Fall Blau’ of 1942, Germany was left without the strength or resources to fight a winning 
war. The Luftwaffe had nearly been bled dry, and with the Allied invasion of Normandy 
in 1944 it could not provide adequate close air support for the defending Wehrmacht. 
The ensuing two-front push into Germany would bring the war in Europe to a close in 
May 1945. 
Chapter IV: The Pacific 
The war in the Pacific truly reflected the emerging dominance of airpower over 
the modern battlefield. The largest theatre of war would be dominated by fleets of 
aircraft, both carrier and land-based, rather than the massive dreadnoughts 
characteristic of previous naval doctrine. The previous massed ‘fleet in-being’ doctrine 
of large warships engaging in a decisive battle would give way to carrier strike groups 
with small nimble aircraft delivering their payload to sink the floating fortresses of 
yesteryear. 
As with the other theatres of war, it would ultimately be the industrial capacity 
and immense resources of the Allies that would deliver the killing blow to the Axis 
power. The United States and Japan both took different paths to increase their wartime 
production, but ultimately the vastly larger and resource rich US would emerge 
victorious. Where the Japanese could only attempt to replace some of their wartime 
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losses, the US would both replace and expand the size of their forces in the Pacific until 
the end of the war. 
The catalyst for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the trade sanctions 
placed upon Japan by the United States in response to Japanese aggression in the 
Pacific region, specifically that into China. This move was not an unpopular one, even if 
it did ultimately provoke Japanese aggression. A 1939 survey revealed that 
approximately 80% of American voters surveyed favored the cessation of sale of war 
materials (including oil) to Japan.189 Due to the incredibly vast distances of the Pacific 
theatre, the importance of the aircraft was increased exponentially over that of Europe. 
Only aircraft could be used to cross the vast ocean between basses and fleets and 
strike the enemy. A wartime commentator remarked during the early stages of the war 
that “Because of its vast distances, the Pacific is of all the oceans the one where air 
power seems destined to play perhaps its greatest role.”190 
Pre-war Japanese planning reflected the reality of the emerging technology of 
the era and the distances it would face during any wartime operations. Japan realized 
that airpower would be the determining factor in the Pacific theatre, and its pre-war 
behavior makes this readily apparent. General war-planning began with the mindset of 
defense from counter-attack. Japanese leadership knew that if it did secure resource-
rich areas in the Pacific, it would certainly face some form of counter-attack by the 
West. Rather than focusing on creation of a massive surface fleet, they would defeat 
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this threat with a network of ground-based attack aircraft.191 A wartime commentator 
best explained this strategy as a product of Japanese doctrinal shift from a naval focus 
to one of air-power: 
“…not until the war was actually in progress did it become plain that Japan had 
assigned her Navy third place among the branches of her armed services. The 
expanded empire which Japan coveted was to be seized by the forces of all arms, with 
the Army and the Air Force taking the leading parts. It was to be defended from 
counterattack principally by air power.”192 
Japan realized reliance upon their navy would bring defeat as early as their 
victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese war after the great naval battle at Tsushima. 
Japan’s hard fought victory did lead to victory in the conflict, but at great cost. The battle 
had left the Imperial Navy severely crippled. To replace the losses suffered would cost 
immense resources, chief among them being time. The losses at Tsushima revealed 
that the large industrialized powers of the West could easily rebuild their fleets and do 
so in a fraction of the time that Japan could.193 It was this early realization, one that 
predated even the Wright Brothers’ flight, which would lead the Japanese military to 
reform their strategic thinking. At the 1935 London Naval Conference Admiral Osami 
Nagano reiterated the lessons learned from Tsushima and the First World War: 
“Even if the Power with a superior navy sends only a part to engage the inferior 
navy of its enemy in such decisive battle, the part of the superior navy remaining in 
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other areas will serve as a latent force which constitutes a definite menace, direct as 
well as indirect, to the defenses of the weaker naval Power. We need only recall the 
naval engagements of the Russo-Japanese and World Wars to be convinced that this is 
a truth to which history itself bears witness.”194 
An American aviation journal observed: "As the naval ratio of Japan is, under the 
Washington treaty, 60 percent of the American naval strength, it may be seen that 
Japan is spending money on her naval air force far in excess of her allotted ratio of 
naval strength, aiming in that service evidently at parity with that of the American 
Navy."195 This observation turned out to be incredibly accurate, as Japan’s true 
appropriations for its air-forces was hidden behind line-items in the naval budget of the 
1920’s through line-item titles such as ‘smaller warships’.196 This development was 
aided by German aircraft design company Dornier who assisted Japan throughout the 
1920’s. They also dedicated vast resources toward one particular goal, to designing an 
aircraft capable of delivering a large payload to the Philippines, specifically to the 
American bases on Manilla.197 
The design of these aircraft was as much a product of geography as it was of 
Japan’s resources. During wartime, the continental “front” that Japan faced to the West 
of its home islands was easily defensible, with traditional army deployment on the 
mainland. However, the Eastern “oceanic front” which spanned over 12,000 miles (from 
the Kurile Islands to New Guinea and Indonesia, with all other islands taken by Japan 
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early in the war adding another 1,000 miles) was vulnerable to outside Naval threats 
which Japan could not meet with traditional naval doctrine.198 The Japanese defensive 
strategy was to create a network of long-ranged land based aircraft which could takeoff 
from the many airstrips on the dozens of small islands that Japan occupied before 1941.  
This doctrine, first proposed by Admiral Baron Kato in 1921, would result in rapid 
concentration of massed air forces to overwhelm any advancing enemy fleet or invasion 
force before it could penetrate the perimeter.199 The thinking followed the notion that 
massed amount of ground aircraft would be able to overwhelm the comparatively small 
numbers brought by enemy aircraft carriers. These massed attacks was similar to 
Japanese Army doctrine, as these pilots were treated more like expendable land 
infantry than highly trained specialists, and their strength would lie in numbers rather 
than ability.200 
Japan’s quest for naval superiority over the West was not exclusive to secretive 
domestic aircraft production and design. At nearly all of the major naval conferences of 
the pre-war era Japan sought to change international law to its benefit.  
The Japanese delegation to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 was 
willing to agree to a loss of capital ship and carrier parity to the US and Britain. They 
sacrificed both number and tonnage of their own ships in return for some concessions 
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from the West for their naval budget.201 This move shows the major commitment the 
Japanese had made to ground-based aircraft for its defense rather than large fleets. 
At the London Naval Conference of 1930 the Japanese pushed for both a 
reduction in Battleship tonnage from 35,000 tons displacement to 25,000 tons, and also 
an increased “age limit” from 20 to 26 years.202 This would render potential adversaries 
more vulnerable to attack from the air. Two years later in Geneva, the Japanese 
advocated for a complete ban of ship-based aircraft, and by extension aircraft carriers 
which would significantly hamper any offensive naval operations against Japan.203 
Although this request was not met, this certainly shows their planned reliance on 
ground-based aircraft to defend their sphere of influence from naval threat. Again in 
1934 Japan attempted to eliminate the carrier threat when Yamamoto offered to the US 
and Great Britain an abolition of the Japanese submarine program in return for an 
abandonment of carriers in the Western fleets.204 This was of course denied once again. 
Following this, Japan refused to renew the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and quit 
the London Naval Agreement of 1935-1936. In March of 1939 Japan announced a new 
naval expansion program that focused on carrier buildup. 
The war in the Pacific began with the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as with 
simultaneous attacks on the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma. These achieved the 
intended goal of both seizing resources (chief among them gasoline, rubber, and 
bauxite) to fuel the Japanese war effort as well as close the gaps in the Pacific 
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defensive perimeter. At this point Japan was only seriously threatened along her Pacific 
front by carrier-led naval assault,205 which she had been preparing to defend against for 
the past two decades. 
The conduct of the war in the Pacific was not one dominated by large surface 
fleets engaging in battleship duels. Rather, it became one of carrier groups employing 
massive amounts of aircraft to destroy opposing air forces and sink capital ships with 
well-aimed torpedoes and dive bombs. Although the Allied ‘Germany First’ strategy 
bought Japan some time, as the full weight of Allied resources could not be brought to 
bear upon her immediately, the odds were most certainly against the nation despite the 
Japanese decision to launch a surprise attack against the United States. 
Failure by the Japanese Navy to destroy the American aircraft carriers stationed 
at Pearl Harbor was undoubtedly the most significant outcome of the attack, save only 
the guarantee of American entry into the global conflict. Retention of those vessels and 
their respective aircraft deprived Japan of a potential major advantage over the 
American fleet. The war in the Pacific would come to prove that naval warfare had 
become as much a question of projecting airpower as it was of warships. Therefore, it is 
apparent that the survival of the American aircraft carriers at Pearl ensured that the US 
Navy could conduct aerial operations from the onset of the war, as showcased by the 
famous Doolittle raid. Furthermore, it allowed for resources to be spent on expanding 
rather than repairing the Navy’s carrier fleet. 
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The Battle of Midway in June 1942 was a decisive point in the battle for airpower 
in the Pacific. The loss of four Japanese carriers: Akagi, Sorya, Kaga, and Hiryu 
compared to only one for the US Navy, the USS Yorktown, tells the tale of the American 
victory. The loss of these ships, which were critical for any naval action beyond the 
range of land-based airfields forced the Japanese on the defensive. The war in both 
hemispheres had proven that ships without proper air support, even mighty battleships 
such as the German Bismarck or British HMS Prince of Wales would be easy prey for 
enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers.206 Earlier that spring, American aircraft had 
also proved the effectiveness of air attack against naval vessels when at the Battle of 
the Bismarck Sea a Japanese troop convoy was attacked resulting in the loss of the 
entire 51st Division as well as four of eight destroyer escorts.207  
Two years later in June 1944 American carrier and by extension air superiority 
over the Pacific was made unassailable. The battle of the Philippine Sea resulted in the 
further reduced Japanese carrier strength, effective eliminating the possibility of 
effective future carrier operations for the Imperial Japanese Navy. Furthermore the IJN 
lost 243 of 347 aircraft while the US Navy lost only twenty-nine, resulting in the moniker 
“the Marianas Turkey Shoot”.208 Ultimately, it was not the loss of their carrier fleet that 
doomed the Japanese Navy, but the inability of the comparatively small island nation to 
replace them. From 1942 to 1944 the US put fourteen new carriers to sea, whereas 
Japan could only manage six.209 This disparity would have ensured at the very least 
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American numerical superiority over the Japanese, even if no carriers were destroyed 
by either nation. 
American qualitative superiority over Japanese aircraft was firmly established 
during the Solomon Isles Campaign, and later reinforced in the actions around New 
Guinea. It soon became apparent the small airfields cut out of the dense jungle of many 
islands simply did not have enough aircraft to contend with the number of planes 
brought to battle by US carriers. This underestimation would undermine the entire 
Japanese defensive plan. 
The number of American carriers, as well as the number of aircraft they carried 
was sufficient to attack both Japanese carrier groups, as well as ground-based airfields 
to disrupt the “flow” of aircraft to battle. This in turn give American pilots numerical parity 
with the Japanese, as well as allowed ground forces to land on islands and capture the 
Japanese airfields themselves.210 This American battle plan was employed to great 
effect in the 1944 Saipan campaign.  
A contemporary author proclaimed that the American spirit of self-reliance and 
ingenuity gave their pilots an advantage in combat due to an innate ability to improvise 
when compared to the Japanese who were from a more regimented ‘order-taking’ 
society: “Japanese fliers have been commanded to use initiative; such men are certain 
to come off second best when put up against men accustomed to use their own wits in 
the face of an unexpected problem almost as instinctively as they breathe.”211 Although 
this point likely originates from a source of personal bias, the examination of the pilots 
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flying the aircraft is just as important as the analysis of the aircraft themselves. Very 
much mirroring the divide in training time between Allied and German pilots in the West 
as the war progressed and demand for pilots for the Axis increased, American pilots 
enjoyed much more thorough training than their Japanese counterparts throughout the 
war. The author also argues that Japanese pilots were not properly nourished when 
compared to American pilots, and that this caused both issues with hearing and 
eyesight that gave American pilots an advantage in the skies even when the aircraft 
were comparable in ability.212 The author goes on to argue that this disparity is the 
largest factor explaining American success against the modern Japanese air force, but 
this seems to be more conjecture than fact. 
Despite the immense challenges facing the Japanese wartime industry, it did 
produce a remarkable amount of aircraft given the circumstances. Although lack of 
natural resources was an undoubtedly important factor, it was not the major limiting 
force in the aircraft production industry. Rather, it was the structure of the system that 
proved its undoing, as a lack of small ‘special parts’ would limit aircraft production. 
Japan’s fighting strength ranged from 4,000 to upwards of 6,000 aircraft when it 
attacked the United States in 1941.213 When viewed in combination with an American 
report that claimed that the US had destroyed approximately 12,000 Japanese aircraft 
from December 7th 1941 to June 29th 1944 the capacity of Japan’s aircraft industry 
becomes apparent.214 
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Until the early 1930s, the Japanese aircraft industry was very small producing 
only 100 to 200 planes annually. However, in 1944, it produced some 24,000 aircraft.215 
The wartime production system in Japan which made this possible was called kyoryoku 
kojo (cooperative factories) which rather than centralizing production spread it out 
across the home islands.216 This system increased the share of the aircraft production 
dramatically in the greater scope of Japanese industry. Where it had only constituted 
8.2% of the national industrial sector in 1941, this number would explode to 33.9% by 
1944.217 Monthly Japanese airframe (jus the frame of the aircraft, not the final aircraft 
itself) production, which was 306 in January 1939, increased to 2,541 in May 1944.218 
The ‘Final Reports’ of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the war 
studies Japanese industrial organization in detail. It found that the entire industry 
depended upon the steady supply of small yet integral parts.219 These parts were 
produced not by the major firms such as Mitsubishi, whose plants would instead focus 
on creating engines and airframes. Rather, their production was outsourced to smaller 
factories scattered throughout the country. The non-concentrated industry did provide 
some benefits to the Japanese, chief among them being the increased resistance to 
aerial bombing it provided. Much of German industry was centralized, which allowed for 
single raids to completely incapacitate an entire production system. In contrast, the 
destruction of one plant in Japan would not halt production. Although this advantage 
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was noticeable during the early stages of American bombing of the mainland, (which 
began in earnest after the capture of the airfields on Saipan in 1944) eventually the 
unrelenting bombing would create a production bottleneck. 
By 1944, there were 204 sub-contractor factories feeding the Japanese aircraft 
industry which produced parts such as bearings, springs, and internal machinery.220 The 
‘Final Reports’ also indicate that MHI (Mitsubishi) contracted out 32% of its work on 
aircraft production to subcontractors.221 This made the greater plants reliant upon the 
small sub-contractors in order to produce completed aircraft. These special parts could 
not be produced in mass quantities by large facilities as the few such facilities that 
Japan had were dedicated to the production of engines and airframes. It was not until 
the end of 1944 when US strategic bombing began to take a heavy toll on Japanese 
industry that a lack of these so-called “machine parts” would hinder and ultimately 
devastate Japanese aircraft production.222 
As a result of the massive losses sustained at Midway and the Battle of the Coral 
Sea in 1942, the Imperial Navy sent requested a massive expansion of the aircraft 
industry, proclaiming it as an absolute necessity for the continuation of the war.223 This 
led to a September 1943 ‘Conference in the Presence of the Emperor’ that stated 
40,000 aircraft needed to be produced in 1944 to effectively defend what was termed 
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the ‘absolute defense sphere’.224 This order corresponded to a government evaluation 
of the aircraft that concluded nearly 50,000 aircraft could be produced per year.225  
Ultimately the industry could only produce half of this perceived maximum. This 
can be mainly attributed to aforementioned lack of parts, rather than other factors. 
Surprisingly, population was not a limiting factor in wartime production. The small island 
nation was able to fully mobilize itself for war, with the majority of the adult population 
either in the military or working in production, greatly due to the structure of its society. 
The Japanese Government ‘Factory Survey’ concluded with regards to the labor force: 
“…the fact that the requested labour force was not satisfied did not cause actual 
damage to production… as the expansion of our equipment and the production 
expansion of outside part suppliers did not keep pace with the increase in labour force, 
the labour force was in excess.”226 Further evidence to the wealth of labor that Japan 
did enjoy comes from the estimates by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 
It reported that employment in the manufacturing industry in 1944 was approximately 
2.5 million, a workforce population five times larger than it was in 1936 when the war 
with China began.227 
 Mass labor would not be enough to hold back the advancing Americans, just as 
mass attacks in the air or on the ground could not. No matter how many workers filled 
the factories of Japan, the lack of parts and constant realities of the American strategic 
bombing campaign prevented production sufficient for an effective defense. Much as 
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the Luftwaffe in the East faltered due to lack of replacement aircraft, the Japanese 
military would see itself with a severe aircraft deficit when compared to the United 
States in 1945. 
 Much as the Allies began bombing of mainland Europe after the offensive 
capabilities of the Luftwaffe was destroyed, the United States began strategic bombing 
of mainland Japan once the Japanese navy’s capacity for offensive operations was 
greatly reduced, and their defensive capabilities insufficient to resist the new American 
B-29’s and P-51 escorts. The strategic bombing effort against Japan as heavily 
influenced by its predecessor in Europe. General Curtis Lemay, the previous director of 
American bombing in Europe was reassigned to direct the strategic bombing of the 
Japanese mainland. His experience and research teams studying the effect of certain 
bombing patters and munitions in Europe, as well as the layout of Japanese cities 
influenced American air strategy moving forward. 
 One such study was commissioned by Army Air Corps General ‘Hap’ Arnold who 
ordered a study of Japanese cities and their susceptibility to fire in February 1942. This 
study was completed in November 1943 and concluded that incendiary area attacks, 
rather than ‘precision’ bombing, would produce the greatest production loss for the 
Japanese, due in part to the dispersed nature of Japanese cities and production therein. 
The report also remarked that “frame-built cities of Japan are highly combustible and 
can be more readily destroyed than the massive-built cities of Germany.”228 
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Undoubtedly the results of this report partly influenced Lemay’s decision to employ 
incendiary bombs against Japan in March 1945.  
 Before March 9th, Lemay’s bombing strategy mirrored that of the European 
strategy. High-altitude bombing with traditional munitions had minimal results. The 
percentage of bombs dropped (from an average height of 30,000 ft) that hit intended 
target areas was less than 10% before March 9th.229 On March 9t, incendiary nighttime 
bombing began from a low height of 7,000ft targeting four main Japanese cities: Tokyo, 
Nagoya, Osake, and Kobe. Over 31 sq. miles of those cities were completely destroyed 
at a cost of only twenty-two American airplanes.230 Over 70,000 Japanese civilians were 
killed in Tokyo alone as a result of the March 9th raids.231 Daytime attacks also were 
conducted at a much lower altitude after this date, and bomb accuracy increased 
substantially to 35-40% within 1000ft of the target in daylight attacks conducted at 
20,000ft or lower.232 
 The decision to use the new incendiary bombs and modify bombing strategy 
against the primarily wooden Japanese cities led to incredible damage to the Japanese 
war economy as well as massive casualties and property destruction. As a result of the 
bombing campaign, 470,000 barrels of oil, 221,000 tons of food, and 2 billion square 
yards of textiles were destroyed.233 Many sectors of the Japanese production industry 
also saw incredible reduction in total output as a result of the nine month bombing 
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campaign. Oil refineries saw an 83% reduction in total output, with similar results 
mirrored in other key industries. Aircraft engine plants saw a 75% drop in production, 
airframe factories 60%, and communications equipment plants 70%.234 National 
aluminum production was also reduced to only 9% of its 1944 peak, and total national 
production dropped approximately 40%.235 Much as in Germany, immense casualties 
were also suffered by the Japanese populace. Total civilian casualties are estimated at 
806,000, with 330,000 of those killed. For comparison, Japanese combat casualties 
during entire war are estimated at 780,000.236 
 The post-war Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that even without direct air 
attack on the home islands the interdiction of imported material to the home islands 
would have caused production to drop by 40-50% by August 1945.237 However, it is 
unlikely that this alone would have led to surrender. However, the immense damage 
caused by the strategic bombing campaign likely forced Japan to surrender without the 
need for an Allied invasion. One post-war report concluded the nation likely would have 
surrendered prior to November 1st due to the immense destruction wrought by the 
continuing firebombing campaign, and that the atomic bombs merely accelerated that 
surrender.238 The deployment of the atomic bombs was the ultimate escalation of the 
bombing campaign, and when coupled with the previous firebombing campaign it is 
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clear that the strategic bombing campaign forced the Japanese surrender and ended 
the war in the Pacific. 
The flaw in Japanese strategic thinking for operations in the Pacific was not on 
their reliance on air power. Rather, it was their belief that air power could be used to 
hold out indefinitely under the proposed Kato “umbrella” against the Western powers. 
The lack of consideration for the industrial capacity of foes such as the United States to 
produce superior as well as greater quantities of aircraft to defeat the Japanese aerial 
defenses would doom the Japanese war effort. This is an intellectual oddity as the 
Japanese doctrinal shift was very much a product of the realization that they could not 
compete industrially in naval production, and yet believed that they could do so with 
aircraft production.  
Perhaps this belief arose from an assumption that captured rubber and aluminum 
resources in the Pacific that would occur in the opening moves of the war would bridge 
the resource gap with the West. Although this is somewhat true, the sheer number of 
factories producing aircraft, and dockyards producing aircraft carriers to ferry them, in 
the United States would overwhelm Japan. The range of American aircraft produced 
later in the war also far exceeded the pre-war expectations of Japanese war planners, 
which left their home industry vulnerable to bombing once the Allies had established a 
foothold in the Japanese defensive sphere.  
Once they had committed to war, only an offensive doctrine, focused upon 
elimination of the American coastal facilities used to replenish their fleet could bring 
about victory. However, such a battle plan was likely beyond the capability of the 
Japanese at any point during the war and also assumes a willingness to surrender on 
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the part of the Americans that was highly unlikely without virtually unachievable success 
by Japan. 
Conclusion: 
 Both the tactical and strategic benefits provided to a modern military became 
abundantly evident during the Second World War. Since the conclusion of the war in 
1945, aircraft have continued to dominate the battlefield. In modern conflicts such as the 
First Gulf War it is still readily apparent that the advantage of aerial superiority is vital to 
success on the modern battlefield. The global conflict of the Second World War was the 
first to showcase the ability for the airplane to facilitate conducting war on a truly global 
scale. Aircraft allowed for the projection of force across oceans and vast tracts of land 
that would otherwise have been incredibly costly and time-consuming. Ultimately, in 
every theatre of war during the great conflict it can be said unquestionably that 
whichever side claimed control of the skies claimed control of the battlefield. Once 
control of the skies was lost by the Axis powers in Europe and the Pacific, the 
battlespace, and therefore the war, was also lost. 
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